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    <title>CoinYQ Crypto Stories</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories</link>
    <description>Sourced stories about people, events and how cryptocurrencies work</description>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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    <title>Enjin Fort Canning: What Comes Back When an NFT Loan Ends?</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/enjin-fort-canning-nft-lending-use-rights</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/enjin-fort-canning-nft-lending-use-rights</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Fort Canning plans timed NFT loans with restricted disposal. A loan returning an item, an expiring token disappearing, and a vote approving code are three different events.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/enjin-fort-canning-nft-lending-use-rights.webp" alt="Enjin Fort Canning: What Comes Back When an NFT Loan Ends?" /></p><p>Fort Canning plans timed NFT loans with restricted disposal. A loan returning an item, an expiring token disappearing, and a vote approving code are three different events.</p><h2>A sword in the player’s hands</h2><p>Imagine a guild lending a game weapon for a weekend. The useful promise is that another player can use it without acquiring unrestricted power to dispose of it. Enjin’s October 6 Fort Canning announcement presents exactly this kind of timed NFT lending. Read on **November 5, 2026**, the mainnet plan still points to separate Relaychain and Matrixchain upgrade dates; this is an explanation of the published design, not a report of Matrixchain activation.</p><p>The distinction matters because a token arriving in an account need not mean the same permissions as an ordinary transfer. Fort Canning describes a borrower who holds an item for a term, with explicit limits on what can happen to it while borrowed.</p><h2>The borrower and lender both accept limits</h2><p>Under the published Matrixchain rules, the borrower can use the token but cannot put it up for sale, send it to another account or burn it. When the loan expires, the chain returns the token to its owner automatically. This is a protocol-defined loan, rather than an unrestricted transfer followed only by a promise to send the item back.</p><p>The owner also gives something up for the agreed period: the lender cannot recall the item early, although they can extend the term. The lender covers the borrower’s token-account deposit. The changelog explicitly describes this as an item-use feature with **no collateral and no interest**, rather than a financial lending product.</p><h2>Lendability is another setting</h2><p>The person minting a token chooses whether it can be lent. Tokens that predate the upgrade start non-lendable; their collection owner can enable lending. Holding an old NFT therefore does not, by itself, establish that its collection has enabled the loan feature.</p><p>Enjin announces support through Enjin Wallet, NFT.io and Enjin Platform alongside the planned Matrixchain rollout. Those are the stated product integrations, not evidence that every game already accepts a borrowed item. The published use cases explain what a game could offer; they do not establish that a particular game has deployed the integration.</p><h2>Returning an item and ending a token</h2><p>A loan deadline and a token’s own expiry are different conditions. The lending rule returns an item. A separate Fort Canning feature lets a non-fungible token be minted with an **expiry block up to one year ahead**. At that block it becomes non-transferable and is destroyed automatically, releasing its deposits and any marketplace hold. The changelog assigns the one-year cap to ephemeral-token creation; this description does not establish the same cap for a loan.</p><p>A durable weapon lent for a weekend and a season pass minted to disappear at season’s end illustrate the difference. In the first design the item is meant to come back; in the second it is meant to stop existing. These are examples of the documented mechanisms, not observations of a particular player’s assets.</p><h2>A vote, a code authorization and a running chain</h2><p>According to Enjin’s **November 9, 2026 update**, Relaychain v1.8.0 took effect at **block 18,059,101 at 17:10 UTC**. This is Enjin’s report; CoinYQ has not independently checked the runtime at a finalized block. The earlier target block and clock estimate below are historical; Matrixchain remains conditional.</p><p>As checked on **November 6, 2026 at 06:13 UTC**, Enjin’s revised changelog estimates the Relaychain upgrade at block **18,059,100** for **November 9 at about 17:12 UTC**, replacing its earlier 16:00 UTC estimate. The block fixed by the approved referendum is authoritative; the clock estimate can move with block times. Matrixchain remains a **November 16, about 16:00 UTC** plan after its proposed November 10–13 vote. Its block **12,331,000** remains a target, subject to the referendum passing and the authorized code being applied. The Matrixchain proposal was published in advance on October 6. Neither an estimated time nor an approved vote independently verifies a running upgrade.</p><p>On November 5, Enjin Governance labels Relaychain referendum **16 APPROVED**. Subscan shows **Enactment Period** and the call **Authorize_upgrade**. Those public-service observations support distinguishing the approved decision from later code application. They do not independently verify that the new runtime is already executing. Enjin reports the Canary upgrades on September 28–29 separately from these mainnet plans.</p><p>There is one more chain boundary: despite shared token pallets arriving in the earlier Relaychain upgrade, the changelog explicitly says lending is not possible on the Relaychain. November 9 should therefore not be read as the opening date for Matrixchain item rentals. For the borrower, the useful questions remain which chain has applied the rule, which actions the loan permits, and whether expiry returns the item or destroys the token.</p><p>As checked **November 15, 2026, 12:08 UTC**, Enjin’s changelog and revised proposal target Matrixchain **v1.4.3** at **block 12,319,600, around November 16 at 16:00 UTC**. The proposal lists voting on November 12–13. These revise the earlier targets recorded above; neither a vote nor authorization proves code application. We have not independently verified the vote, authorization or runtime activation. Both block and time remain estimates.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://enjin.io/blog/enjin-blockchain-fort-canning-upgrade/">Enjin Blockchain “Fort Canning” Upgrade</a></li><li><a href="https://enjin.io/changelog/fort-canning/">Fort Canning technical changelog — upgrade schedule and status</a></li><li><a href="https://gov.enjin.cloud/proposals/16">Relaychain referendum 16 — approved vote and authorization call</a></li><li><a href="https://enjin.subscan.io/referenda_v2/16">Referendum 16 — enactment period and Authorize_upgrade call</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/enjin/governance-proposals/blob/master/GP-2026-11-10-01-matrixchain-v1-4-1-upgrade.md">Matrixchain runtime v1.4.3 proposal — current revision</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Glamsterdam: Reworking Ethereum’s Block Assembly Line</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/ethereum-glamsterdam-hoodi-block-validation</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/ethereum-glamsterdam-hoodi-block-validation</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Hoodi remains deferred. The EF asks developers to review gas assumptions behind EIP-8037/8038, part of Glamsterdam’s wider resource redesign.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/ethereum-glamsterdam-hoodi-block-validation.webp" alt="Glamsterdam: Reworking Ethereum’s Block Assembly Line" /></p><p>Hoodi remains deferred. The EF asks developers to review gas assumptions behind EIP-8037/8038, part of Glamsterdam’s wider resource redesign.</p><h2>The rehearsal is postponed</h2><p>On October 22, 2026, the Ethereum Foundation postponed Glamsterdam on Hoodi. The former target—October 26 at 17:42:48 UTC, epoch 132,352—is no longer scheduled. There is no replacement date. Mainnet still has no activation date, and this Hoodi announcement requires no action from mainnet users or ETH holders.</p><p>The Foundation attributes the delay to further investigation of EIP-8037’s interactions with mainnet smart contracts. Hoodi’s merged PR #33 removes the Amsterdam and Gloas activation settings and the accompanying 200 million gas schedule. This withdraws a future configuration; it does not undo Hoodi’s chain history.</p><p>The earlier announcement remains useful for understanding the design, but its activation instructions have been superseded. Hoodi operators need execution and consensus clients whose release notes explicitly incorporate the postponement. The earlier client table does not establish that support. Application developers now have a separate review task. The Foundation’s November 6 update asks contract developers and auditors to check eight gas assumptions that code treats as always true, in both contracts and off-chain components, while Hoodi remains deferred.</p><p>Nethermind’s 2.2.1 release warned that a Hoodi node left on 2.2.0 would activate the old Glamsterdam rules on October 26 at 17:42:48 UTC and diverge from the network. It also requires a consensus-client release that removes the scheduled fork. Nethermind says this patch removes Hoodi’s reservation and does not affect other networks. This is a warning about the old configuration, not evidence that a chain split was observed.</p><p>The Foundation’s updated table now links **ethrex v30.0.1**, a final release published on October 23, in place of the earlier v30.0.1-rc.2 prerelease. Its notes confirm that Glamsterdam is no longer scheduled on Hoodi. The earlier release-candidate label should therefore not be carried over to v30.0.1. This change does not establish a replacement Hoodi activation date or a mainnet schedule.</p><p>The client distinctions still matter. **Grandine 3.0.0-rc.2 is a prerelease**: its notes require the upgrade for Hoodi nodes on rc.1, remove the Gloas activation schedule and explicitly tell mainnet users not to install this release. **Erigon v3.8.1** removes the Amsterdam and Gloas Caplin activations and the 200 million gas schedule; it also asks operators to check their consensus and validator clients. These are software-release instructions, not a report that a new network transition has occurred.</p><h2>Give each job its own time</h2><p>Ethereum nodes have to agree on a block and verify what its transactions do. EIP-7732, known as **enshrined proposer-builder separation** or ePBS, rearranges that work. A builder commits to an execution payload; the proposer includes that commitment, and the builder reveals the payload later. The protocol provides the payment mechanism between those roles.</p><p>The useful change is in the timetable. Consensus checks can happen before full execution validation. A committee reports whether the payload and its blob data arrived in time; that report does not itself certify that every transaction executed correctly. Execution still needs checking, but the workload can occupy more of the available time.</p><h2>Give the inspectors a map</h2><p>More time helps, but a node also needs to know which pieces of its database a block will touch. EIP-7928 adds **block-level access lists**: records of accessed accounts and storage locations, together with changes after transactions. A client can use this information to fetch data in parallel and organize transaction validation.</p><p>Think of several inspectors receiving the same parts list before work begins. The list saves discovery work; it does not make the inspection optional. The EIP requires checking the supplied list against execution. A block whose list is wrong fails validation. Parallel work must still produce the state required by the block’s transaction order.</p><h2>Capacity has a storage bill</h2><p>The withdrawn 200 million gas target illustrates a resource budget, not 200 million transactions: operations consume different amounts of gas. EIP-8261 provides a way to schedule that target, but the October 26 Hoodi increase has been removed. The former setting is neither an active Hoodi schedule nor an observed mainnet throughput result.</p><p>A larger budget also makes lasting database growth matter more. EIP-8037 raises and separately meters state-creation costs, including new accounts, storage and contract code. Capacity expansion therefore comes with changed resource accounting; it is not a uniform discount on every operation.</p><p>The Foundation’s repricing tests found contracts whose fixed gas assumptions need attention. Some cases can be addressed by supplying more gas; others require reviewing the contract’s logic. This is why a testnet milestone matters beyond its date: client teams and application developers can check how the new rules behave before a mainnet rollout.</p><p>The November 6 review reaches beyond raising a gas allowance. The repository says most reported findings concern **INV-4**, fixed gas budgets, and **INV-7**, reserves or fixed gas allowances for calls sized for earlier costs. ChainSecurity’s linked analysis explains how repricing and state-gas accounting can change failure handling, so checking logic matters as well as changing constants. The repository’s numeric examples use a pinned specification and can change; they are review targets, not universal production gas estimates.</p><p>The list supplies explanations, examples and review prompts. The EF also links an illustration of the separate state-gas pool that explicitly leaves opcode execution costs out. Those resources support a review, rather than constituting a complete application test. The maintainers request private reports through their published contact channel instead of public issues.</p><p>In its November 6 update, the Foundation keeps Hoodi deferred until these issues are resolved and says Hegota work continues in parallel. It announces no replacement Hoodi date or mainnet activation. The message is directed at developers and auditors, requests no fund movement from ETH holders, and does not report a current mainnet exploit.</p><h2>A review timetable is not an activation date</h2><p>In its November 9 update, the Foundation recommends that All Core Devs wait for public audit findings and time to review them before deciding on specification revisions or Hoodi scheduling. Possible revisions are being prototyped and reviewed; the November 19 discussion has no pre-committed decision.</p><p>The audit dates also need care. The EF’s table lists delivery and publication on November 13, while the November 16 ACDT agenda describes ongoing audits with completion expected November 16–19. At our November 14 check, we did not identify the final audit reports in the EF update, that agenda or the linked invariants repository. Those schedules alone establish neither actual report publication nor a new activation date.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/16/glamsterdam-hoodi-announcement">Glamsterdam Hoodi Testnet Announcement</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/eth-clients/hoodi/pull/31">Historical Hoodi activation configuration: PR #31 (superseded by #33)</a></li><li><a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7732">EIP-7732: Enshrined Proposer-Builder Separation</a></li><li><a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7928">EIP-7928: Block-Level Access Lists</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/08/24/glamsterdam-repricing-testing">Glamsterdam Repricing Impact for Smart Contract Developers</a></li><li><a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8261">EIP-8261: Gas Limit Schedule</a></li><li><a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8037">EIP-8037: State Creation Gas Cost Increase</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/10/22/glamsterdam-hoodi-delay">Glamsterdam on Hoodi Postponed</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/eth-clients/hoodi/pull/33">Hoodi: merged PR #33 removes the Glamsterdam activation and gas-limit schedule</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/NethermindEth/nethermind/releases/tag/2.2.1">Nethermind 2.2.1: remove the Hoodi fork; warning for nodes left on 2.2.0</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/lambdaclass/ethrex/releases/tag/v30.0.1-rc.2">ethrex v30.0.1-rc.2 (Pre-release): unschedule Amsterdam on Hoodi</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/lambdaclass/ethrex/releases/tag/v30.0.1">ethrex v30.0.1: final release removes the Hoodi schedule</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/grandinetech/grandine/releases/tag/3.0.0-rc.2">Grandine 3.0.0-rc.2 (Pre-release): Hoodi update; not for mainnet</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/erigontech/erigon/releases/tag/v3.8.1">Erigon v3.8.1: removes Hoodi activations and gas schedule</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/11/06/glamsterdam-8037-8038">EIP-8037/EIP-8038 Glamsterdam — November 6 post, November 9 update</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/ethereum/glamsterdam-gas-invariants/blob/5998e8929869d6cd66c04f8e920db1dfa1189e66/README.md">Glamsterdam gas invariants for auditors — recorded repository revision</a></li><li><a href="https://www.chainsecurity.com/blog/glamsterdam-gas/">Glamsterdam Hard Fork: When Spent Gas Comes Back</a></li><li><a href="https://rahul-kothari.github.io/repricing/">EIP-8037 gas reservoir — illustrative visualization linked by EF</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/ethereum/pm/issues/2299">ACDT #103 agenda: ongoing audits and expected completion, November 16–19</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Chainlink VRF: A Proof Needs an Answering Service</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/chainlink-vrf-shutdown-proof-and-service</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/chainlink-vrf-shutdown-proof-and-service</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Chainlink schedules VRF v1 and v2 shutdowns for November 2026. The dates expose a distinction between verifying a random answer and keeping the service that delivers it.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/chainlink-vrf-shutdown-proof-and-service.webp" alt="Chainlink VRF: A Proof Needs an Answering Service" /></p><p>Chainlink schedules VRF v1 and v2 shutdowns for November 2026. The dates expose a distinction between verifying a random answer and keeping the service that delivers it.</p><h2>Two future dates, different from deprecation</h2><p>A smart contract can depend on a service whose operating life is shorter than the contract’s recorded history. Chainlink’s VRF documentation makes that boundary concrete: as checked on **November 7, 2026**, VRF v1 is scheduled to shut down on **November 18** and VRF v2 on **November 30**. The notice says those versions will no longer fulfill randomness requests after their respective dates. Both shutdowns are still future events at this check.</p><p>Neither date should be confused with **November 29, 2024**, when the documentation says v1 and v2 were deprecated. The notice also lists a **48-hour v2 brownout on October 28–30, 2026**. That scheduled window is now in the past; it is a temporary-interruption milestone, not the permanent cutoff. This article did not independently observe the brownout or test an old service endpoint.</p><h2>What a verifiable random answer proves</h2><p>VRF means **Verifiable Random Function**. Chainlink describes a request producing random values with a cryptographic proof, which is published and checked onchain before the consuming application uses the values. The proof provides a way to verify a delivered result. It does not, by itself, cause the external service to keep generating and delivering future responses.</p><p>Consider an application waiting for a random assignment. A recorded request and a valid response are different stages; the application’s next action may depend on the latter. The practical implication of the shutdown notice is therefore about **continued fulfillment**, not an assertion that old records disappear or earlier verified results become invalid. An onchain address or transaction history alone does not establish that its external dependency will answer the next request.</p><h2>Migration changes the consumer’s connection</h2><p>The migration guides show why updating a version label is insufficient. From v1, the consumer’s request and callback interfaces change, including receipt of an array of random words instead of a single value. From v2, v2.5 introduces a structured request with extra arguments and changes subscription identifiers from 64-bit to 256-bit integers. These are interfaces between the application and the randomness service, not a migration of the LINK token.</p><p>The v2 walkthrough calls for updated contract code and redeployment; subscription users create a new v2.5 subscription. Direct funding has its own wrapper changes. The new setCoordinator capability is described as a way to ease later coordinator upgrades, not as evidence that every previously deployed consumer automatically changes service. The guides explain a migration path; they do not establish which individual applications have completed it or how each handles outstanding requests.</p><h2>Delivery and application handling remain separate</h2><p>The v2.5 security guide adds another boundary. Responses may arrive in a different order from requests, so they must be associated with the right request identifier. It warns against re-requesting or cancellation that lets someone discard an unfavorable result, and against accepting outcome-changing inputs after requesting randomness. It also says a reverting fulfillRandomWords callback will **not be called a second time by the service**. Receiving verifiable randomness and safely completing the application’s action are separate responsibilities.</p><p>The useful reading questions are which VRF version and coordinator an application depends on, whether that service still fulfills requests, and how the application handles its response. The notice names retirement of specific VRF versions; it does not announce retirement of every Chainlink service. It gives calendar dates without an exact cutoff hour in the cited notice. This is an explanation of the published schedule and design boundaries, not a claim of current failure, a tested migration or a guarantee about any particular application.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://docs.chain.link/vrf">Chainlink VRF — version shutdown notice and request model</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.chain.link/vrf/v2-5/migration-from-v1">Migrating from VRF v1</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.chain.link/vrf/v2-5/migration-from-v2">Migrating from VRF v2</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.chain.link/vrf/v2-5/security">VRF v2.5 Security Considerations</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Samsung Wallet’s USDC: Who Holds It, Where It Goes</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/samsung-wallet-usdc-custody-transfer-paths</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/samsung-wallet-usdc-custody-transfer-paths</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Samsung Wallet’s Stablecoin Account brings custodial USDC into a familiar app. A crypto transfer and a local-currency bank remittance still take different paths.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/samsung-wallet-usdc-custody-transfer-paths.webp" alt="Samsung Wallet’s USDC: Who Holds It, Where It Goes" /></p><p>Samsung Wallet’s Stablecoin Account brings custodial USDC into a familiar app. A crypto transfer and a local-currency bank remittance still take different paths.</p><h2>A familiar app, a different kind of balance</h2><p>Samsung Wallet places a dollar-linked digital asset beside familiar wallet features. That familiar setting does not turn the balance into a checking account. Samsung’s October 7 announcement described a late-October rollout; the Solana Foundation’s November 5 report instead identifies **November 2, 2026** as the launch date. Announcement and reported launch are different dates.</p><p>Samsung’s current FAQ says the account holds **USDC, not bank deposits**. It says Samsung is not a bank and the USDC balance and rewards lack FDIC, NCUA and SIPC protections. The distinction matters before comparing an app balance with money deposited at a bank.</p><h2>The interface is not the custodian</h2><p>Samsung supplies the interface. Bastion provides the custodial wallet and money-movement services; Samsung’s announcement says Samsung itself does not hold customer funds. Coinbase describes its role as **sub-custodian on behalf of the licensed provider**, through Coinbase Prime. A familiar phone screen is therefore the front door to a partner-operated custody arrangement, not evidence that the user controls the private keys.</p><p>Conversion adds other providers. Samsung’s FAQ assigns bank/card USDC purchases to Stripe, its affiliates and ramp partners including Bridge; bank/debit-card withdrawals go through Coinflow and its financial-service providers. A transfer completed on Coinbase’s webpage has Coinbase’s own terms and fees. These roles should not be collapsed into one generic Samsung payment service.</p><h2>Two destinations, two different deliveries</h2><p>For a crypto-wallet transfer, the receiving side gets **USDC on a compatible network**. Samsung’s announcement limits its no-Samsung-transfer-fee statement to that wallet route; external providers may charge fees, and network conditions affect speed. The launch report describes USDC on Solana, but Samsung’s FAQ says current network and deposit/withdrawal availability can change and must be checked in-app. That is not a claim that every USDC network is supported.</p><p>An international bank remittance has a different endpoint: the recipient receives **local currency in an eligible bank account**, without needing a Stablecoin Account. Samsung lists more than 60 destination countries in its announcement, subject to bank eligibility. Fees vary with destination and amount, and delivery time can vary. The wallet’s shared Send entry point does not make a bank remittance the same operation as a blockchain transfer.</p><h2>What the launch does not establish</h2><p>This is a U.S. eligibility-limited service, not a worldwide account launch. The published requirements include adulthood and a compatible Galaxy device with Android 13 or later; New York residents are excluded. Samsung’s **82 million** figure counts compatible U.S. devices, not opened accounts or people using USDC. Online and in-store stablecoin payments were described as possible future capabilities, not functionality established by this launch.</p><p>The useful question is what reaches the recipient and which provider is responsible at each step. Custody, digital-asset transfer and conversion to bank money are separate jobs even when one app presents them together. This explanation follows the published service descriptions as checked on November 7; it does not independently test an account, transfer or every device’s feature availability.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://www.samsung.com/us/support/answer/ANS10013605/">Samsung Wallet Stablecoin Account FAQs</a></li><li><a href="https://news.samsung.com/us/samsung-wallet-bring-stablecoin-access-eligible-galaxy-users-us/">Samsung Wallet to Bring Stablecoin Access to Eligible Galaxy Users in the US</a></li><li><a href="https://www.coinbase.com/en-sg/blog/coinbase-and-samsung-bring-usdc-to-samsung-wallet">Coinbase and Samsung Bring USDC to Samsung Wallet</a></li><li><a href="https://solana.com/news/samsung-wallet-solana">Stablecoin Account Goes Live in Samsung Wallet, Bringing USDC on Solana to Eligible U.S. Galaxy Users</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Mobile ZK: When a Timed Run Leaves No Proof</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/mobile-zk-android-benchmark-proof-completion</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/mobile-zk-android-benchmark-proof-completion</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[An Ethereum Foundation benchmark on ten Android phones separates timed iterations, saved proofs and the work a credential app still has to do.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/mobile-zk-android-benchmark-proof-completion.webp" alt="Mobile ZK: When a Timed Run Leaves No Proof" /></p><p>An Ethereum Foundation benchmark on ten Android phones separates timed iterations, saved proofs and the work a credential app still has to do.</p><h2>What the failed run actually says</h2><p>A zero-knowledge (ZK) credential flow may let a phone prove a selected fact, such as eligibility, without disclosing every field in its credential. The Ethereum Foundation’s November 3 report asks whether that work fits the phones people own. It measured ten physical Android devices inside applications, where the operating system could terminate a memory-hungry process. These are credential-proof workloads, not Ethereum transaction-throughput tests.</p><p>The Galaxy A06 result needs more than the table’s failure label. In **each of two OpenAC Prepare attempts**, the cold iteration and **three or four warm iterations** completed before Android’s low-memory killer stopped the process. Neither attempt left a proof to retrieve. Recorded work therefore did not become a completed benchmark run with an output artifact. This describes the tested configuration, not every possible implementation on that phone.</p><h2>Prepare and presentation are different jobs</h2><p>OpenAC’s Prepare step checks and processes a credential once and saves state. A later presentation combines a Show proof with re-randomization of the Prepare and Show proofs. To test that later stage on the A06, the team supplied a **laptop-generated Prepare proof**. Its **6.18-second warm presentation median** is consequently not evidence that the phone completed the whole preparation-and-presentation flow on its own.</p><p>The harness, a test runner that automates the measurements, configured a fresh app process for **one cold iteration plus five warm iterations**, ten seconds apart. Warm results summarize the five repeats; there are six planned iterations, not five in total. For completed runs, the last proof was pulled from the phone and verified on a laptop. The interrupted A06 Prepare attempts lacked that final artifact.</p><h2>Two clocks on the same device</h2><p>The coordination-network credential proof has a different structure: eight checks share one proof. On the Galaxy A06, Infinix SMART 8 and moto g05, standard-mode warm medians were **7.85, 9.11 and 9.61 seconds**, respectively. Their cold totals were **13.3, 15.7 and 16.9 seconds**. Cold setup includes loading the reference parameters (SRS) and circuit, then deriving the verification key. Calling all of these results an 8–10-second wait would erase that distinction.</p><p>The two systems use different credential formats and divide preparation differently. Even a fast individual Show step omits other work in a complete OpenAC presentation. A comparison should identify which stage was timed, what state was supplied beforehand and whether loading was included. Those boundaries matter before treating a benchmark row as a promise about an app.</p><h2>Work that the timer left outside</h2><p>The OpenAC test runner skipped re-reading the **374 MB circuit description** that the mobile app described in the cited repository revision reads on every Prepare. Presentations do not read that file. The results preserved in that revision disclose this difference explicitly: their Prepare timings do not include the same repeated file-reading work as that app. They cannot simply be substituted for its end-to-end latency.</p><p>The runs also reused one set of shared blinding values across presentations, while the SDK draws fresh ones. The README says the computational work is the same, but the benchmark did **not test whether two presentations could be linked**. Performance evidence is not an unlinkability test. This limitation establishes neither a general privacy guarantee nor a demonstrated privacy failure.</p><h2>The application questions still open</h2><p>The report covers one set of runs per phone and workload set on two dates. It did not measure battery use, integrated application size, integration effort or the wait people would accept. Five warm repeats provide a small timing sample; they do not establish a service’s reliability across everyday background workloads or repeated user sessions.</p><p>Memory figures need their own label. The reported resident-memory high-water mark, VmHWM, includes mapped key files and excludes pages compressed into zRAM; it is not the quantity Android’s killer acts on. The Infinix memory peaks are treated as a floor, and its firmware changed between the two dates. Android’s own documentation describes process killing as a response to memory pressure. A phone’s advertised RAM is not a universal per-app allowance.</p><p>The cited repository revisions preserve iteration records, session metadata, trimmed logs and outputs from completed runs. They say the full logs, host runner and predictions are in a repository not yet public. The useful result is a map of what completed under stated conditions. For a product claim, the next questions are which proof was actually delivered, what preparation remained outside the timer, and which privacy and user-experience properties were tested separately.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://publicsector.ethereum.foundation/articles/mobile-zk-benchmarks/">Benchmarking Zero-knowledge Credential Proofs on Low-end Mobile Devices</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/ethereum/zkID/blob/591f49a95efd33cba8ee7ba8f768d46aac036993/wallet-unit-poc/mobile/bench-results/README.md">OpenAC Android results — pinned zkID revision 591f49a</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/ethereum/coordination-network/blob/6c27308d71ca2a4e2475cab8c432895e8ff44cff/packages/noir-prover-native/android-bench/results/README.md">Coordination-network Android results — pinned revision 6c27308</a></li><li><a href="https://source.android.com/docs/core/perf/lmkd">Android low memory killer daemon</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>ENSv2: A Shorter Grace Period, the Same Release Date</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/ensv2-expiry-grace-release</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/ensv2-expiry-grace-release</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[ENSv2 shortens .eth grace from 90 days to 28 and adds 62 days at upgrade. The arithmetic preserves a release boundary, while resolution can stop before exclusivity ends.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/ensv2-expiry-grace-release.webp" alt="ENSv2: A Shorter Grace Period, the Same Release Date" /></p><p>ENSv2 shortens .eth grace from 90 days to 28 and adds 62 days at upgrade. The arithmetic preserves a release boundary, while resolution can stop before exclusivity ends.</p><h2>One name, more than one deadline</h2><p>An ENSv2 .eth name can stop pointing to an address while still being unavailable for someone else to register. That is the useful distinction behind the new grace period. ENS Labs announced ENSv2 on Ethereum mainnet on **October 27, 2026**. Its support documents, checked on **November 4**, describe a shorter window after expiry without an earlier release date for an otherwise unchanged registration upgraded from v1.</p><p>The launch did not automatically move every existing name into the new rules. ENS says existing names continue to work and do not need to be registered again. Its upgrade guide describes an optional transition with no deadline and lists names the current app cannot yet upgrade. A rule for an upgraded name and a rule for one still on ENSv1 can therefore coexist.</p><h2>Expiry stops resolution before it opens registration</h2><p>For an **ENSv2 .eth name**, expiry starts **28 days** of grace. During that period the name stops resolving: it no longer points to the wallet or other records until renewed. For a name **still on ENSv1**, grace lasts **90 days**, and the name keeps working during that window. The version changes both the length of grace and what the name does while in it.</p><p>Both versions keep an important boundary: nobody else can register the name during grace, and it cannot be transferred then. Renewal brings it back to its existing owner. Resolution—the lookup that returns the name’s destination—and exclusivity against another registration are separate states. An inactive v2 name is not, for that reason alone, available to a stranger.</p><h2>Where the missing 62 days go</h2><p>The upgrade changes both sides of the expiry boundary. ENS says it adds **62 days to the registration once**, while grace falls from 90 to 28 days. For an unexpired v1 name with no separate renewal, let its old expiry be `E`. Its former release boundary was `E + 90 days`. After upgrade, expiry becomes `E + 62 days`, followed by 28 days of grace: **62 + 28 = 90**. This is an illustration of the documented rule, not a lookup of an individual name.</p><p>The extra 62 days are a one-time transition adjustment, not a recurring extension. The simple comparison also assumes no other change to the registration term. For a name already in grace, the ENS App first renews it and then upgrades it. That renewal changes the expiry baseline, so the resulting date cannot be explained by adding only 62 days to the old date.</p><h2>Renewing a term does not buy control of the name</h2><p>During grace, anyone can pay to renew a name, but that does not make the payer its owner. ENS says renewal returns the name to its existing owner and never changes ownership. The added term is measured from the old expiry date, not the day someone submits the renewal. Those are different questions: who may extend the term, who controls the name and where the renewed period starts.</p><p>The 62-day calculation also does not promise that every name can use the current upgrade flow. The guide lists exceptions, including Safe-held names and names whose subnames have further subnames. The relevant condition is a completed, eligible upgrade. Reading the mainnet announcement does not establish that any particular name has moved to v2.</p><h2>Price Cooldown is already open to other registrants</h2><p>When grace ends without renewal, the old renewal path closes. The name enters **Price Cooldown**, when anyone can register it at the normal price plus a declining premium. ENS describes a **21-day** cooldown, after which the premium reaches zero. That is not another 21 days reserved for the former owner: registration is already open, and the former owner has no priority.</p><p>The practical reading of a date therefore needs three pieces of context: which version the name uses, when its registration expires and when protection against a new registrant ends. The upgrade’s 62-day adjustment preserves the last boundary in the simple unchanged-term case. It does not erase expiry, make a stopped name work throughout grace or restore priority after release. The useful change to understand is how those states fit together, rather than one shorter number in isolation.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://ens.domains/blog/post/ensv2-live-on-mainnet">ENSv2 Is Live on Mainnet</a></li><li><a href="https://support.ens.domains/en/articles/15180020-expiry-grace-period">Expiry &amp; grace period — updated November 3</a></li><li><a href="https://support.ens.domains/en/articles/15180070-upgrade-your-name-to-ensv2">Upgrade your name to ENSv2 — eligibility and one-time extension</a></li><li><a href="https://support.ens.domains/en/articles/15179997-eth-name-lifecycle">.eth name lifecycle — grace and Price Cooldown</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Two Migrations in Akash’s Solana Proposal</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/akash-solana-token-marketplace-migration</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/akash-solana-token-marketplace-migration</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Akash’s official proposal record now reports approval. Its submitted text separates a conditional token launch from a later marketplace cutover; a vote result does not prove either transition has run.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/akash-solana-token-marketplace-migration.webp" alt="Two Migrations in Akash’s Solana Proposal" /></p><p>Akash’s official proposal record now reports approval. Its submitted text separates a conditional token launch from a later marketplace cutover; a vote result does not prove either transition has run.</p><h2>Recorded approval leaves execution conditions to establish</h2><p>On October 26, 2026, Greg Osuri announced the Akash core team’s selection of Solana as the proposed home for the network. The plan would replace Akash’s sovereign Cosmos chain with marketplace programs on Solana. But the proposal submitted to voters separates two decisions that a headline about a chain migration can easily collapse: launching SPL AKT and moving the computing marketplace.</p><p>At **06:08 UTC on November 4**, the official Akash REST response reported proposal 346 as **PROPOSAL_STATUS_PASSED**. Its voting-end field is **November 2 at 15:02:58 UTC**; that is the vote-period boundary, not an independently verified time at which the passing status was finalized. The reported result records approval of the proposal. It does not establish that SPL AKT or the portal has launched, or that the computing marketplace has moved. The submitted text explicitly leaves marketplace cutover to later audits, rehearsals and a separate proposal.</p><h2>The token track concerns ownership records</h2><p>The token design concerns which chain records a holder’s AKT. It proposes a one-way portal: AKT removed from circulation on akashnet-2 would be represented by the same number of base units as SPL AKT on Solana. The design’s central accounting condition is that newly represented tokens are backed by verified removals, rather than creating a second spendable copy of the same units. This is a proposed mechanism, not a verified live portal.</p><p>That change would not by itself move a tenant’s workload or replace a provider’s lease. The proposal leaves live leases, staking and governance on akashnet-2 unchanged before cutover. The old chain therefore still has a job while the token and marketplace tracks follow different readiness conditions.</p><h2>The marketplace has work left to settle</h2><p>A marketplace holds more than users’ token balances. The design distinguishes user accounts from funds held by protocol modules, including escrow that must be attributed as leases settle. It also marks parts of the wind-down accounting as still under review. Moving a token balance cannot, on its own, decide which provider has earned a payment or which tenant is owed a refund.</p><p>The later cutover would move new deployment activity to Solana after marketplace audits, migration rehearsals and a separate on-chain cutover proposal. The proposed plan then allows a 90-day wind-down for existing leases before the old chain halts. Those are conditions and stages in the plan; neither publication of the plan nor the reported approval demonstrates that the audits, cutover or wind-down have happened.</p><h2>Three documents do not make one calendar</h2><p>The dates need particular care. The October 26 announcement says token launch comes two weeks after approval, subject to two independent audits. The token and rollout documents, labeled **v0.10, draft for review, October 20**, instead define launch as seven days after the migration vote passes. The text actually submitted as proposal 346 says launch is expected two to three weeks after passage, once token and portal audits are complete. An expectation conditional on audits does not establish a calendar date.</p><p>Other draft figures also differed from the **October 27 chain observation**. The draft uses a 14-day unbonding period and describes 20% quorum with a three-day vote. At block **29,244,551**, the official endpoints returned 1,814,400 seconds for unbonding, or 21 days, and governance parameters of 33.4% quorum and 604,800 seconds, or seven days. These remain a dated comparison of sources and chain state, not a new parameter observation, instructions to unbond or a promise about future parameters.</p><p>The rollout draft also requires a token-readiness gate before submission, while the submitted proposal conditions launch on completed audits. Submission or reported approval alone does not prove that this draft gate was met. The proposal points to a pinned plan commit. In the **October 27 comparison**, its token and rollout files were identical to those in the main revision checked then. That comparison did not reconcile the conflicting timelines. The approved text establishes the authorization granted, not readiness of every implementation detail. We do not turn any of these relative durations into a migration deadline.</p><h2>What would establish the next stage</h2><p>The useful distinction is between authorization, readiness and execution. The service’s reported passing status now supplies evidence for authorization, within that observation’s limits. Published audit and rehearsal evidence would address readiness. A later approved cutover schedule and evidence of its execution would establish the marketplace transition. Approval of proposal 346 does not answer all three questions.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://akash.network/blog/why-we-selected-solana-for-akash/">Why We Selected Solana for Akash</a></li><li><a href="https://api.akashnet.net/cosmos/gov/v1/proposals/346">Akashnet-2 proposal 346 — submitted text and reported passing status</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/akash-network/AEP/blob/0805c517a16952df95573906e2a4da7128ef0b66/spec/aep-79/doc/05-token-migration.md">AEP-79 token migration, v0.10 draft — pinned plan</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/akash-network/AEP/blob/0805c517a16952df95573906e2a4da7128ef0b66/spec/aep-79/doc/10-rollout-and-cutover.md">AEP-79 rollout and cutover, v0.10 draft — pinned plan</a></li><li><a href="https://api.akashnet.net/cosmos/staking/v1beta1/params">akashnet-2 staking parameters — observed 2026-10-27</a></li><li><a href="https://api.akashnet.net/cosmos/gov/v1/params/voting">akashnet-2 governance parameters — observed 2026-10-27</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Bancor (BNT): The Token Sale That Outgrew Its Website</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/bancor-150m-ico-ethereum-congestion-first-amm</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/bancor-150m-ico-ethereum-congestion-first-amm</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Bancor reported 396,720 ETH in its 2017 token sale, extending the sale after problems with its website and application. Its reserve-based AMM and later BNT freeze powers tell a different story from an Ethereum-wide shutdown.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/bancor-150m-ico-ethereum-congestion-first-amm.webp" alt="Bancor (BNT): The Token Sale That Outgrew Its Website" /></p><p>Bancor reported 396,720 ETH in its 2017 token sale, extending the sale after problems with its website and application. Its reserve-based AMM and later BNT freeze powers tell a different story from an Ethereum-wide shutdown.</p><h2>1. A name from money that never entered circulation</h2><p>Before Bancor was a token, bancor was money that never circulated. John Maynard Keynes and E. F. Schumacher conceived it in 1940–42 as a supranational unit for settling trade between central banks. The name came from the French banque or, &apos;bank gold.&apos; Britain brought the plan to Bretton Woods, where it was not accepted.</p><p>The Bancor Protocol is named in honor of the transnational currency unit for recording and balancing international trade as John Maynard Keynes proposed at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944.</p><p>The protocol&apos;s April 28, 2017 draft v0.77 was followed by draft v1.00 on June 6. Eyal Hertzog, Guy Benartzi, and Galia Benartzi were credited as authors, with contributions and edits from Scott Morris and Bernard Lietaer. Court papers place the Israel-based founders under Bprotocol Foundation, a Swiss nonprofit seeking a &apos;global standard for intrinsically tradeable currencies.&apos;</p><p>The design put reserves inside each smart token&apos;s contract. Anyone could buy from or sell to that contract: tokens were issued on entry and destroyed on exit. &apos;SmartTokens do not need to be traded in an exchange in order to become liquid,&apos; the paper said, promising convertibility without a listing.</p><h2>2. Bancor reported 396,720 ETH as its website buckled</h2><p>On June 12, 2017, Bancor ran what coverage called the largest token sale to date. Bancor reported 10,885 participants and 396,720 ETH—about $150 million, or roughly $153 million on the project&apos;s site—surpassing The DAO&apos;s reported $152 million from the previous year.</p><p>The dollar figure depended on ether&apos;s price. Finance Magnates counted 396,619 ETH worth over $142 million at $360 per ether; the $153 million figure reflected higher marks. These were proceeds actually received, not a company valuation.</p><p>The disruption was at Bancor, not Ethereum. The one-hour window became three after what the team called &apos;overwhelming demand and traffic, and massive malicious attacks&apos; on its site and application. Buyers saw errors and pending payments; contemporaneous reports do not say the chain halted.</p><p>Bancor created 79,323,978 BNT and sold roughly half; one buyer reportedly took $27 million. The whitepaper earmarked 20% of proceeds for the network token&apos;s Ether reserve, the on-chain collateral for its pricing formula.</p><h2>3. The math: reserves and ratios instead of order books</h2><p>A smart token&apos;s price equaled reserve balance divided by the product of supply and its fixed Constant Reserve Ratio (CRR). When CRR was below 100%, buying added reserves and minted tokens as price rose; selling burned tokens and released reserves as price fell. This is the price at that point on the curve. With CRR below 100%, a finite trade changes the price as reserves and supply change, so its effective price also depends on the trade size.</p><p>Token-changer contracts held two or more reserves at a total CRR of 100%, with arbitrage correcting relative prices. BNT was the hub—&apos;the first smart token to be deployed using the Bancor protocol&apos;—and held a single Ether reserve.</p><p>The whitepaper described these contracts &apos;acting as automated market makers&apos;: the project&apos;s wording for fixed-rule contracts quoting continuous prices without a human market maker. It supports a formula-priced liquidity protocol published in spring 2017, not a claim that Bancor was the first AMM or influenced later designs.</p><p>Uniswap v1 instead lets liquidity providers deposit equivalent values of ETH and the associated ERC-20 token into an exchange contract, then prices swaps by the constant-product rule x·y = k. Swaps change the balances of the two traded assets rather than minting or burning those assets against a CRR reserve. Bancor priced by reserve ratio and supply; Uniswap v1 by pool balances.</p><h2>4. A compromised wallet and the power to freeze BNT</h2><p>In July 2018, Bancor lost about $23.5 million: $12.5 million in Ether, $1 million in NPXS, and $10 million in BNT, according to TechCrunch. The entry point was not the pricing formula but a privileged upgrade wallet.</p><p>a wallet used to upgrade some smart contracts was compromised.</p><p>Bancor said it froze the stolen BNT but could not freeze the Ether or NPXS, and took its exchange offline. The response demonstrated control over its own token—the tension Charlie Lee criticized as the news broke:</p><p>An exchange is not decentralized if it can lose customer funds OR if it can freeze customer funds. Bancor can do BOTH. It&apos;s a false sense of decentralization.</p><p>On June 18, 2020, Bancor disclosed a flaw in a v0.6 contract deployed two days earlier. A bug in three versions led users to grant infinite approvals, and 1inch identified &apos;a public method&apos; that could exploit them. Bancor said its developers used a controlled exploit to move assets to safety; reports also noted user losses.</p><h2>5. Bancor and Uniswap, then a lawsuit and a discovery request</h2><p>Uniswap v1 priced swaps through ETH-and-ERC-20 reserve pools using the constant-product rule x·y = k. Fees retained in the reserves can increase the product after a trade. Bancor minted and burned tokens against a reserve ratio; Uniswap v1 changed the balances of an ETH-token pool. These are different pricing mechanics.</p><p>The compared primary documents support technical contrast, not a claim that Bancor influenced Uniswap or that one protocol succeeded the other. The record here is deliberately narrower than a lineage story.</p><p>A later complaint alleged this Bancor timeline: v1 in 2017, v2 in April 2020, v2.1 in October 2020 with impermanent-loss protection, and v3 on May 11, 2022. Plaintiffs alleged that a June 19, 2022 withdrawal spike led to the protection&apos;s suspension and losses for withdrawing investors.</p><p>The class action was filed in May 2023. On September 6, 2024, Judge Robert Pitman dismissed without prejudice the claims against the foundation, LocalCoin, and founders for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to allege domestic transactions—not on the merits. In their May 27, 2025 motion, plaintiffs stated that the court had reinstated the non-moving Bancor DAO and that the clerk had entered default against it; they asked for discovery concerning jurisdiction, domestic transactions, class certification, and damages before a contemplated default-judgment application. The motion was a party request, not a default judgment, merits ruling, or fraud finding.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://resources.bancor.network/pages/BancorProtocolWhitepaper.pdf">Bancor Protocol Whitepaper (Draft v0.77, April 28, 2017)</a></li><li><a href="https://bernard-lietaer.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Bancor-Whitepaper-V1.0-1.pdf">Bancor Whitepaper (Draft Version 1.00, June 6, 2017)</a></li><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bancor">Bancor — Keynes&apos;s proposed supranational currency</a></li><li><a href="https://siliconangle.com/2017/06/13/bancor-sets-initial-coin-offering-record-raising-150-million/">Bancor sets &apos;initial coin offering&apos; record, raising over $150 million</a></li><li><a href="https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/bancor-crowdsale-raises-140-million-less-three-hours/">Bancor Crowdsale Raises Over $140 Million in Less Than Three Hours</a></li><li><a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/10/bancor-loses-23-5m/">The crypto world&apos;s latest hack sees Bancor lose $23.5M</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.1inch.com/bancor-network-hack-2020/">Bancor Network Hack 2020</a></li><li><a href="https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/bancor-users-report-fund-loss-after-vulnerability-discovery/">Bancor Users Report Fund Loss After Vulnerability Discovery</a></li><li><a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-txwd-1_23-cv-00533/pdf/USCOURTS-txwd-1_23-cv-00533-1.pdf">Order Adopting Report and Recommendations, Basic et al. v. BProtocol Foundation et al., No. 1:23-CV-533-RP (W.D. Tex.)</a></li><li><a href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/basic-v-bprotocol-foundation-1000407252780">Report and Recommendation, Basic v. BProtocol Foundation, No. 1:23-cv-00533 (W.D. Tex.)</a></li><li><a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/63c177fd300aebf674381b3f/687e59cc42a1b6a4a710958f_ECF%2081%20-%20Motion%20for%20Leave%20to%20Conduct%20Discovery.pdf">Plaintiffs&apos; Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery, Basic et al. v. BProtocol Foundation et al., ECF No. 81</a></li><li><a href="https://hackmd.io/@HaydenAdams/HJ9jLsfTz">Uniswap v1 Whitepaper</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Fighting Sandwich Attacks With an Auction: CoW Protocol’s MEV Reversal</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/cow-protocol-mev-batch-auction</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/cow-protocol-mev-batch-auction</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 22 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[CoW Protocol grew from Gnosis’s batch-auction research into a market where users sign intents and bonded solvers compete to settle them. Coincidences of wants, uniform directed prices and contract-enforced limits reduce the ordering advantage behind sandwich attacks without pretending that every trade can avoid on-chain liquidity.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/cow-protocol-mev-batch-auction.webp" alt="Fighting Sandwich Attacks With an Auction: CoW Protocol’s MEV Reversal" /></p><p>CoW Protocol grew from Gnosis’s batch-auction research into a market where users sign intents and bonded solvers compete to settle them. Coincidences of wants, uniform directed prices and contract-enforced limits reduce the ordering advantage behind sandwich attacks without pretending that every trade can avoid on-chain liquidity.</p><h2>1. The market saw a transaction; the bot saw an option</h2><p>When a trader clicks swap on a decentralized exchange, they assume their trade is finished. On a public blockchain, however, an ordinary transaction is broadcast to the mempool before execution. Automated searchers constantly monitor this queue, analyzing slippage tolerances and token amounts. A bot can buy ahead of the trader, let the trader&apos;s volume elevate the price, and sell immediately afterward. The trader requested an exchange; the transaction queue handed an arbitrageur a short-lived option on their trade.</p><p>That pattern is widely known as a sandwich attack. Its extraction mechanism depends on transaction ordering: one transaction executes before the victim to push up the price, and a second transaction follows behind to capture the profit. The automated market maker simply executes its formula, but the user receives the worst acceptable price within their slippage tolerance. Custody is not stolen, but the open queue allows intermediaries to harvest the slippage gap.</p><p>GPv2 addressed that structural flaw rather than offering a marginally better route through the same vulnerable queue. As presented at EthCC in July 2021, orders were grouped off-chain into batches and submitted to a competition among independent solvers. Trades within the same batch received uniform clearing prices regardless of internal ordering, while remaining unmatched volume could still tap into Ethereum&apos;s external automated market maker liquidity.</p><p>This distinction forms the essential boundary of the protocol. CoW Protocol does not eliminate all extractable value, nor does it guarantee that every order matches peer-to-peer. Instead, it shifts who constructs execution, avoids broadcasting each intent as an ordinary direct swap, and enforces identical prices for identical directed pairs in a batch. MEV resistance is a bounded economic mechanism, not an absolute guarantee.</p><h2>2. Gnosis replaced the queue with a five-minute room</h2><p>The underlying architecture began before the protocol adopted its cow branding. Gnosis launched its first trading protocol on April 15, 2020, following two years of research into improved on-chain trading mechanisms. Every five minutes, the protocol gathered open orders into a batch auction, invited settlement proposals, and executed ring trades that maximized trader welfare under uniform clearing prices. Its initial focus was facilitating liquidity for long-tail prediction market tokens.</p><p>Ring trades expanded the traditional barter model across multi-token cycles. Alice might want to exchange Apples for Bananas, Dan wants Carrots for Apples, and Carlos wants Bananas for Carrots. Even without a direct pair match between two traders, a multi-party cycle satisfies all three participants simultaneously. In token trading, this shared settlement allows liquidity to circulate directly across multiple orders without routing every trade through intermediate base pairs.</p><p>A centralized operator is replaced by open, incentivized competition, in which anyone can submit order settlement solutions.</p><p>GPv2 launched in April 2021, with CowSwap as its first user-facing application. It carried forward batch auctions, uniform pricing and solver competition, while moving order collection off-chain: users signed intents rather than placing each order on-chain as in the first protocol. Solvers could also use external decentralized liquidity when internal matches were insufficient. The CoW name refers to the coincidence of wants that makes direct matching possible.</p><h2>3. A wish list for machines called solvers</h2><p>A trade on CoW Protocol is structured as an intent: a cryptographically signed message defining acceptable execution boundaries. The user specifies tokens, amounts, limit price, expiration and recipient, leaving the execution path open. Bonded solvers examine pooled intents and available liquidity to propose feasible settlements. The auction compares bids by the surplus delivered to orders, subject to its fairness and computational constraints; maximizing trade volume is a different objective.</p><p>This structure transforms trade routing into an open solver optimization contest. A solver can match opposing orders directly peer-to-peer, group overlapping trades into aggregate transactions, or construct multi-asset ring trades. When an order only partially coincides with opposing demand, the solver matches the overlapping balance internally and routes the remainder through decentralized automated market makers. Direct coincidence of wants serves as an optimization opportunity rather than a prerequisite.</p><p>CoW (Coincidence of Wants): An economic phenomenon where two parties - each holding the asset that the other needs - exchange assets directly in an equivalent barter.</p><p>Open solver competition requires strict contractual safeguards. Solvers must post financial bonds and operate under protocol rules that reward the solution generating the greatest economic surplus for the batch. Mathematical specifications treat each intent as an immutable acceptance set, measuring execution surplus relative to the signed limit price. Solvers search for optimal routes, but cannot alter the explicit boundaries the user authorized.</p><h2>4. Why the cow blocks the sandwich</h2><p>The protocol&apos;s primary defensive layer is delegated execution. Because traders sign off-chain intents rather than broadcasting individual swap transactions directly to Ethereum, their orders are not exposed to public-mempool MEV in the same way as ordinary on-chain swaps. Bonded solvers assume the responsibility and gas risk of submitting settlement bundles. The signed intent is therefore not the same standalone, route-ready transaction that a searcher ordinarily targets in Ethereum&apos;s public queue.</p><p>The second defensive layer is the uniform directed clearing price. All orders trading the same token pair in the same direction within a given batch auction receive the exact same price. Because reordering trades within the batch cannot alter that uniform price, sandwich bots lose the ordering leverage needed to extract arbitrage profits. When orders match directly through a coincidence of wants, trades settle peer-to-peer without touching AMM reserve pools.</p><p>GPv2Settlement checks the signature, expiry, signed limit price and how much of the order has already been filled. An order that permits partial fills can be executed in pieces; the implementation checks that the accumulated sell amount for a sell order, or buy amount for a buy order, does not exceed the signed quantity. Fill-or-kill orders instead require the full amount. External-liquidity interactions do not directly access user funds; allow-listed, bonded solvers remain part of the settlement design.</p><p>A signature and a token allowance have different jobs. The intent authorizes the trade&apos;s terms; for the documented ERC-20 path, the allowance is granted to the vault relayer contract, not to a solver. Protocol contracts use that allowance while enforcing the signed order. Signing an intent is therefore neither a direct transfer to a solver nor proof that settlement has occurred.</p><h2>5. The auction learned to judge its own winners</h2><p>In January 2022, governance proposal GIP-13 asked Gnosis DAO to spin out the development team, formalize the name CoW Protocol, and deploy CoW DAO alongside the COW governance token. The proposal would place key protocol parameters, including scoring metrics and slashing mechanisms, under token-holder governance. The batch-auction mechanism was being presented as independent, community-governed public infrastructure for Ethereum.</p><p>As the protocol matured, researchers examined a subtle auction problem: a batch auction can maximize aggregate social welfare while still producing an unfair outcome for an individual trader. In an August 2024 research paper, economists Andrea Canidio and Felix Henneke formalized this structural tension. Batch auctions can deliver greater aggregate surplus than independent trade-by-trade auctions, yet certain batched bids may leave one participant worse off than the individual-bid benchmark.</p><p>The protocol filters out &quot;unfair&quot; batched bids, which are those delivering less to an order than some available &quot;non-batched&quot; bids.</p><p>The fair combinatorial auction addresses this dilemma by asking solvers for both individual and batched bids. The protocol constructs an individual counterfactual benchmark and filters a batched bid when an order falls below it. The paper also makes the cost explicit: fairness can reduce total value returned to traders, and its equilibrium guarantee depends on the counterfactual mechanism. The achievement is a transparent trade-off, not mathematical perfection.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://www.gnosis.io/blog/announcing-gnosis-protocol">Announcing Gnosis Protocol</a></li><li><a href="https://ethcc.io/archives/gnosis-protocol-v2-fighting-the-mev-crisis-with-batch-auctions-one-cow-at-a-time">Gnosis Protocol v2: Fighting the MEV Crisis with Batch Auctions, One CoW at a Time</a></li><li><a href="https://forum.gnosis.io/t/gip-13-phase-2-cowdao-and-cow-token/2735">GIP-13 (Phase 2): CowDAO and COW Token</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.cow.fi/cow-protocol/concepts/introduction/fair-combinatorial-auction">Fair Combinatorial Batch Auction</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.cow.fi/cow-protocol/concepts/introduction/solvers">Solvers</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.cow.fi/cow-protocol/concepts/how-it-works/coincidence-of-wants">Coincidence of Wants</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.cow.fi/cow-protocol/concepts/benefits/mev-protection">MEV protection</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.cow.fi/cow-protocol/reference/contracts/core/settlement">GPv2Settlement</a></li><li><a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12225">Fair Combinatorial Auctions: Endogenous Best Execution in Blockchain Trade-Intent Markets</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/cowprotocol/contracts/blob/ea0c36591b6da73b9ba4e2e2107897080c7f9b68/src/contracts/GPv2Settlement.sol">GPv2Settlement implementation — partial fills and amount bounds (source revision)</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Stellar Bell: Why the Ledger Reader Needs an Upgrade</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/stellar-bell-ledger-format-readers</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/stellar-bell-ledger-format-readers</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Stellar’s Testnet Horizon records a Protocol 29-to-30 boundary on November 3. Mainnet’s vote remains a separate schedule; ledger formats, address routing and signature scope still need different checks.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/stellar-bell-ledger-format-readers.webp" alt="Stellar Bell: Why the Ledger Reader Needs an Upgrade" /></p><p>Stellar’s Testnet Horizon records a Protocol 29-to-30 boundary on November 3. Mainnet’s vote remains a separate schedule; ledger formats, address routing and signature scope still need different checks.</p><h2>An observed Testnet boundary; a separate Mainnet vote</h2><p>A check after the scheduled vote time on **November 3, 2026** found a concrete boundary in SDF’s Testnet Horizon records. Ledger `5540312` reports Protocol 29 and a close time of **17:00:00 UTC**. The next ledger, `5540313`, reports Protocol 30 and **17:00:05 UTC**. The latter’s previous-hash field matches the former’s hash. This is an observed change in the service’s protocol-version records, rather than an inference from the scheduled 17:00 vote.</p><p>These are ledger close times reported by the SDF-operated public Horizon service, not independently measured wall-clock times for the vote. Our check did not replay consensus or verify individual validator votes. SDF’s introduction and guide still showed their pre-vote text at 18:00 UTC. The guide’s **November 23 at 17:00 UTC Mainnet vote** remains a separate proposed milestone; these Testnet records do not establish Mainnet activation.</p><p>Stellar Core v30.0.0 was released on October 16. SDF introduced Bell and its upgrade guide on October 20; the guide shows an October 23 update. Those remain implementation and preparation milestones. In this update, the returned ledger records—not the existence of a release or the passing of a scheduled time—provide the evidence for the observed Testnet protocol boundary.</p><h2>A finer clock can preserve the old meaning of a second</h2><p>CAP-88 adds a millisecond-resolution close time, `closeTimeMs`, to the record agreed for a ledger. The familiar `closeTime` field remains in whole seconds and must equal the new value rounded down to seconds. Reading only the old field therefore keeps the same unit; the proposal does not silently turn an existing seconds value into milliseconds.</p><p>Transaction time bounds, `minSeqAge`, claimable-balance time predicates and Soroban’s `ledger_timestamp` keep their whole-second semantics. What can change is an assumption around them: consecutive ledgers can, under the new timing rules, share the same whole-second timestamp. “One ledger later” is no longer a sound substitute for “at least one second later.”</p><p>The finer clock removes a protocol constraint on possible ledger intervals. It is not a measurement of the network running faster, nor a commitment to a particular new interval. SDF describes Bell as preparation for later steps toward faster ledgers. Clock precision, a chosen operating target and observed performance remain separate facts.</p><h2>The surrounding record needs a new decoder</h2><p>The boundary is precise. CAP-88 says the ledger that applies the upgrade still uses the older whole-second value format. **The next ledger** must use one of the new millisecond value types. The format follows the protocol version of the previous ledger, rather than the wall-clock date of a release or an announcement.</p><p>XDR is the schema that tells software how to decode these records. The new `StellarValue` variants also appear inside ledger headers, ledger-close metadata and raw consensus history. A decoder built with older definitions cannot recognize those variants. Even an application interested only in the unchanged whole-second `closeTime` needs definitions that can first read the surrounding record. This is why the guide requires SDK/XDR updates while describing the transaction-facing changes as additive.</p><h2>A W address carries routing information, not another balance</h2><p>CAP-84 gives a contract address a **64-bit multiplexing identifier** and a textual form beginning with **W**. The idea extends the existing muxed-account model to contracts: a business can distinguish off-chain customer destinations behind one contract instead of needing a different contract address for each one. The upgraded Stellar Asset Contract transfer function can accept that muxed contract address as its destination.</p><p>The underlying transfer still goes to the same non-muxed contract. Its event records the identifier as `to_muxed_id`, so the application can attribute the incoming amount. The identifier does not create an independent on-chain balance or change the transfer’s authorization rules. Customer accounting remains work for the product that interprets this routing information.</p><p>There are two reading jobs here too. An updated SDK supplies the W-address parser, but application code must recognize the new variant wherever it validates, displays, stores or routes addresses. Contract argument types matter separately: a plain `Address` rejects a muxed address, whereas `MuxedAddress` accepts the muxed form as well as ordinary addresses. A parser update is not proof that every application path has adopted the new destination type.</p><h2>A new verifier does not replace every signature</h2><p>CAP-87 adds Soroban host functions to verify the ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 signature variants. A contract can use this capability in its own authorization logic or when checking a signed statement from another system. Existing contracts do not automatically acquire a different authorization policy. The new functions are protocol-gated; importing them before the required protocol version is not supported.</p><p>**Network transaction signatures remain Ed25519.** SDF and the proposal explicitly limit this change to verification inside smart contracts. That gives contract-account designers a building block for post-quantum authorization, not evidence that all Stellar accounts or the network as a whole have completed a post-quantum migration.</p><h2>Read compatibility at the layer where it is promised</h2><p>SDF’s guide says existing contracts keep working, while SDK and raw-XDR consumers need updated definitions and address-handling applications need to consider W destinations. These statements concern different interfaces. They can all be true at once: the accepted behavior of an old transaction can remain familiar while the software that observes it needs a new vocabulary.</p><p>For this rollout, three useful questions have separate answers: which protocol the network has adopted, which data format surrounding software can decode, and which optional contract features an application uses. The Testnet records now answer part of the first question. Mainnet adoption and application handling still need their own evidence; a release or a scheduled date cannot answer all three.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://stellar.org/blog/developers/introducing-bell-protocol-30-on-stellar">Introducing Bell, Protocol 30 on Stellar</a></li><li><a href="https://stellar.org/blog/developers/bell-protocol-30-upgrade-guide">Bell, Protocol 30 Upgrade Guide — updated October 23</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/stellar/stellar-core/releases/tag/v30.0.0">Stellar Core v30.0.0 release</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/stellar/stellar-protocol/blob/master/core/cap-0084.md">CAP-0084 — Muxed Contract Addresses</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/stellar/stellar-protocol/blob/master/core/cap-0087.md">CAP-0087 — Host functions for ML-DSA signature verification</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/stellar/stellar-protocol/blob/master/core/cap-0088.md">CAP-0088 — Millisecond-Resolution Close Times</a></li><li><a href="https://horizon-testnet.stellar.org/ledgers/5540312">SDF Testnet Horizon — ledger 5540312, reported Protocol 29</a></li><li><a href="https://horizon-testnet.stellar.org/ledgers/5540313">SDF Testnet Horizon — ledger 5540313, reported Protocol 30</a></li><li><a href="https://developers.stellar.org/docs/networks">Stellar Networks — SDF Testnet and its public Horizon service</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Bitcoin Core: A Paused Queue Can Still Fill Up</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/bitcoin-core-paused-queues-memory-limits</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/bitcoin-core-paused-queues-memory-limits</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Two October 28 disclosures show different gaps in Bitcoin Core’s backpressure. Linux is exempt from the TCP urgent-data issue, but that exception does not extend to the paused-send issue.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/bitcoin-core-paused-queues-memory-limits.webp" alt="Bitcoin Core: A Paused Queue Can Still Fill Up" /></p><p>Two October 28 disclosures show different gaps in Bitcoin Core’s backpressure. Linux is exempt from the TCP urgent-data issue, but that exception does not extend to the paused-send issue.</p><h2>Two advisories need two sets of conditions</h2><p>On October 28, 2026, Bitcoin Core published two memory-exhaustion advisories, **CVE-2026-117350** and **CVE-2026-117349**. The maintainers classify both as Medium severity. They concern a node’s ability to keep running when a connected peer causes data to accumulate. Their shared lesson is about backpressure: slowing a producer or pausing a connection only limits memory if every path that can grow the waiting queue respects that limit.</p><p>The platform qualification belongs to the first issue. The TCP urgent-data advisory explicitly excludes Linux and describes the affected Windows, macOS and BSD socket path. The second advisory concerns announcements accumulating for a send-paused peer that does not support BIP31’s nonced ping messages. **The Linux exception from the first advisory cannot be carried over to the second.** These are published vulnerability conditions; the disclosures do not establish that a particular service was attacked or lost funds.</p><h2>A receive pause bypassed by an exceptional event</h2><p>Bitcoin Core limits how much data it queues for processing from each peer. When that waiting data becomes too large, it temporarily stops reading from the connection. On non-Linux platforms, the select() socket backend nevertheless kept watching the socket for exceptional conditions. Handling such an event could trigger another read, adding more data even though ordinary reads were paused. TCP urgent, or out-of-band, data could trigger that route.</p><p>The advisory says this could drive unbounded memory growth and crash a connected node on the affected platforms. Linux uses the poll() backend and does not take this vulnerable path. PR #36665 changes when exceptional conditions are monitored: the socket must also be one from which the program is waiting to read. The PR explains that exceptional monitoring still has a purpose on Windows, where it helps detect failed connection attempts. The fix therefore makes the event path respect the read decision instead of assuming every socket event is harmless.</p><h2>A send pause without an effective lifetime limit</h2><p>The other issue starts on the outgoing side. When a peer reads slowly and its outgoing message queue passes a limit, Bitcoin Core marks it as paused for sending. Some announcements can still be appended, especially frequent transaction inventory announcements, known as INVs. A pause flag does not mean that all producers have stopped adding work to that peer’s queue.</p><p>Normally, a peer that fails to answer a nonced ping within **20 minutes** is disconnected. The advisory explains that this disconnection was not enabled for peers lacking BIP31 support, so such a connection could remain paused and its queue could grow slowly without a bound. This is different from the first issue’s socket-event bypass. The advisory also says nodes running with -blocksonly are much less affected because transaction announcements account for most of the queued messages. That is a qualification about this second issue, not a claim of immunity or a substitute for the published fixes.</p><h2>One fix controls an event; the other bounds a pause</h2><p>PR #36665 closes the mismatch between the receive-pause decision and exceptional socket monitoring. PR #36667 takes a different approach: it introduces a timeout for peers that stay paused for sending, using a **20-minute** interval. Its stated goal is to stop retaining a connection whose send buffer cannot drain within a reasonable period, even when the usual ping-based disconnection does not help.</p><p>The distinction matters when reading a security summary. A memory problem is not defined only by the amount of data in one packet. It can also arise from repeatedly admitting data around a stopped reader, or from retaining slowly accumulating work for too long. These repairs address different control points. Neither a platform exception for one path nor a lighter announcement workload establishes protection against every memory-exhaustion condition.</p><h2>Read the release dates and support status separately</h2><p>Both advisories list **29.5, 30.4, 31.2 and 32.1** as releases containing the fixes. Their timelines place the merges and backports on October 26, releases 31.2 and 32.1 on October 27, and releases 29.5 and 30.4 plus public disclosure on October 28. The publication date is therefore not the date every fix first became available, and 32.1 is not the only fixed branch.</p><p>A backported fix also does not promise continued maintenance. The 32.1 release notes state that 29.x and older versions have reached end of life. Readers evaluating these disclosures need the implementation and version, the operating-system path for the first issue, and the peer/queue conditions for the second. This article explains the official conditions and repairs; it does not reproduce an attack, benchmark memory growth or independently verify deployment across the Bitcoin network.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://bitcoincore.org/en/2026/10/28/disclose-tcp-oom/">CVE-2026-117350 — TCP urgent data on non-Linux systems</a></li><li><a href="https://bitcoincore.org/en/2026/10/28/disclose-fpausesend-oom/">CVE-2026-117349 — paused pre-BIP31 peers</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/36665">PR #36665 — align exception monitoring between socket backends</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/36667">PR #36667 — enforce timeout for paused send peers</a></li><li><a href="https://bitcoincore.org/en/releases/32.1/">Bitcoin Core 32.1 release notes</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Solana’s Nonce Plan: An Approval Can Outlive Its Delivery</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/solana-durable-nonce-offline-authorization</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/solana-durable-nonce-offline-authorization</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Solana plans to retire durable nonces without abandoning offline signing. The proposed program-based approach separates a lasting authorization from the short-lived transaction that carries it.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/solana-durable-nonce-offline-authorization.webp" alt="Solana’s Nonce Plan: An Approval Can Outlive Its Delivery" /></p><p>Solana plans to retire durable nonces without abandoning offline signing. The proposed program-based approach separates a lasting authorization from the short-lived transaction that carries it.</p><h2>A plan with a conditional clock</h2><p>An offline approval may take longer to collect than a normal Solana transaction remains valid. Durable nonces address that mismatch today. The Solana Foundation’s October 16, 2026 changelog linked to a plan to retire them, but the upgrade page remains **In Development**. It describes an onchain program verifying an offline signature, with Anza’s Programmatic Signer and Blueshift’s Vector as candidates. It does not name a final replacement or a removal date.</p><p>The page expects removal roughly **six months after a suitable replacement is ready**, and says durable nonces stay available until a replacement is audited and live on mainnet. That is not a countdown from the October announcement. Anza’s own documentation currently reports a Devnet deployment, audits in progress and remediations required before v1 and any mainnet deployment; interfaces may change. Published Vector code and program addresses do not, by themselves, establish an audited mainnet rollout. This article explains the published designs, not a completed network change.</p><h2>What the current nonce preserves</h2><p>A normal transaction refers to a recent blockhash and has a limited acceptance window. A durable nonce transaction substitutes a value stored in a System Program nonce account. That lets the signer approve the transaction offline and someone else submit it later, without the ordinary blockhash expiry. The stored value also provides replay protection: a transaction signed against an old nonce cannot simply be used again after that nonce advances.</p><p>Failure has two different meanings here. The current documentation says a nonce transaction rejected during validation—for example because the nonce was already used—is dropped without fees or state changes. If it passes validation but an instruction fails during execution, however, **the nonce still advances and the fee is collected**. The application action can fail while the old signed transaction becomes unusable. Describing every rejected attempt as consuming a nonce would miss this distinction.</p><h2>The approval and its carrier have different lifetimes</h2><p>Programmatic Signer separates the action into three layers. An execution message lists the application instructions. An authorization message binds that work to an executor and a nonce account; the required authorities sign its exact bytes. A relay transaction then carries the authorization and signatures onto the network, using an ordinary recent blockhash and a fee payer. Programs check the offline signatures, advance their own nonce and invoke the approved instructions. The validator sees a normal transaction.</p><p>Imagine a signed approval as the contents of a delivery envelope. If the envelope expires, the relayer can prepare a fresh relay transaction and sign that outer transaction again; the authorization inside need not be signed again. The analogy has a precise limit: the relayer cannot edit the approved instructions or substitute different accounts inside the authorization. In Anza’s documented format, the execution message’s blockhash field holds the expected nonce, while the outer relay’s field holds the recent blockhash. The fields serve different purposes.</p><h2>The calling account and signature boundary also change</h2><p>The program acts for the offline authority through a **program-derived address (PDA)** and calls the application through **cross-program invocation (CPI)**. An existing keypair and that derived account are not interchangeable identities. A program that insists on a top-level call can reject this path. An indexer looking only at outer transaction signers may see the relayer, while the acting PDA appears in inner instructions. Supporting offline authorization therefore involves more than replacing one expiry field.</p><p>The candidates also differ in what the signature freezes. Programmatic Signer lets a relayer add instructions before or after Submit, while forbidding changes inside the signed authorization. Vector binds every top-level instruction into the signed digest, including its passthrough contents; the relayer cannot add, remove or reorder those instructions after signing. Both use program-managed replay protection and CPI, but they offer different boundaries for surrounding work. Neither description establishes that an application is already compatible.</p><h2>Expiry, cancellation and a retry are different events</h2><p>Neither published design gives an authorization a built-in deadline. The relay transaction expiring is therefore **not cancellation of the authorization**. Advancing the relevant nonce invalidates an authorization tied to its previous value; a business deadline instead has to be enforced by an instruction covered by the signed payload. A date shown by an approval tool is not enough unless the executed rules actually check it.</p><p>The designs also allow a failed execution attempt to leave the authorization available for another try when the transaction rolls back and the nonce remains unchanged. That is different from the current durable nonce’s execution-failure behavior, and it does not promise eventual success or free network attempts: ordinary transaction fees still apply. For readers evaluating the plan, the useful questions are what was approved, which account will act, what can invalidate the approval, and whether the receiving application accepts that call path. The Foundation says ordinary transactions are unaffected by the planned removal; the migration concerns workflows that use durable nonces.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://solana.com/upgrades/durable-nonce-deprecation">Durable Nonce Deprecation</a></li><li><a href="https://solana.com/news/solana-changelog-october-16-2026">Solana Changelog — October 16, 2026</a></li><li><a href="https://solana.com/docs/core/transactions/durable-nonces">Durable Nonces — transaction validation and failure behavior</a></li><li><a href="https://www.solana-program.com/docs/programmatic-signer">Programmatic Signer — overview and deployments</a></li><li><a href="https://www.solana-program.com/docs/programmatic-signer/messages">Programmatic Signer — Messages</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/blueshift-gg/vector">Vector — execution model and transaction expiration</a></li><li><a href="https://solana.com/docs/core/fees">Transaction Fees</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Pactus Berlin: What a Live Anchor Preserves</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/pactus-berlin-live-state-anchors</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/pactus-berlin-live-state-anchors</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Pactus 1.17.0 implements an account slot for a current commitment. Its design separates a surviving digest from a preserved document, an exact clock and a permanent revocation record.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/pactus-berlin-live-state-anchors.webp" alt="Pactus Berlin: What a Live Anchor Preserves" /></p><p>Pactus 1.17.0 implements an account slot for a current commitment. Its design separates a surviving digest from a preserved document, an exact clock and a permanent revocation record.</p><h2>A software release and a separate protocol switch</h2><p>On October 28, 2026, Pactus released version 1.17.0, named Berlin. Its native state anchoring feature gives an account a place to retain a current commitment to off-chain data. The release and its implementation are available, but PIP-50 makes the feature conditional on **protocol version 5**. This article examines the published design and released code; it does not independently establish that mainnet has switched to v5.</p><p>PIP-51 tells a proposer to raise the block version when its view of announced support exceeds **75% of committee power**, not 75% of node count. PIP-50 adds a crucial qualification: this is a proposer transition rule, not a block-validity test based on each node’s local support estimate. Those estimates can differ. Nodes accept valid, certified v5 blocks; producing the required certificate needs more than two-thirds of committee power running v5-capable software. A release tag or a support percentage alone is therefore not proof of a completed transition.</p><h2>A current statement, rather than another receipt</h2><p>A transaction memo can show that an account recorded a digest in the past. That does not answer whether the account still attests to it. PIP-50 puts one optional anchor in the account’s current state, covered by the existing account Merkle tree and the global state root. A node that has pruned old transaction bodies can still read that live slot.</p><p>The slot holds a bounded hash, an optional location for external data, a type hint, the locked deposit and creation/update fields. It does not hold the document, an application database or a search index. For a service manifest, for example, an application could compare its external document with the account’s current commitment instead of treating an old transaction as proof that the manifest is still current. This is an application pattern described by the PIP, not evidence of a deployed service.</p><h2>The deposit belongs to the occupied slot</h2><p>The detailed rules are more precise than the announcement’s broad wording about create and update deposits. Creating a slot locks at least **1 PAC**. For an existing slot, the additional deposit may be **0**: the existing lock remains, and the transaction fee still applies. The v1.17.0 executor applies the minimum-deposit check only when no anchor exists. Deleting the slot returns its locked deposit minus the deletion fee. This is a refundable lock on occupied state, not interest, yield or a promise that every operation is free.</p><h2>A block timestamp is not an independent clock</h2><p>Creation height and time come from the block that creates the slot; the signer cannot supply arbitrary timestamp fields. The update fields refer to the block that set the current root hash. Changing only the location, type hint or deposit while retaining the same hash does not reset that date. Both PIP-50 and the tagged executor preserve this distinction.</p><p>That prevents a transaction author from simply typing a preferred date into the anchor payload. It does not turn the timestamp into a trusted external clock. The Unix time comes from the proposer’s block header and remains subject to the protocol’s accepted timing bounds. PIP-50 identifies block height as the authoritative ordering. A date attached to a digest should therefore be read as a chain observation, not independent proof of an exact real-world moment.</p><h2>Deleting an anchor also removes its dates</h2><p>The useful promise of pruning resistance is narrow: a slot that remains in current state can be read without its original transaction. After deletion, GetAnchor reports no active slot and its timestamp fields are gone. Current state alone cannot distinguish an account that never anchored anything from one that anchored and then deleted. Nor can it say when deletion occurred; that evidence is in the delete transaction, which a pruned node may no longer retain.</p><p>This matters for revocation records. Removing the slot ends the current attestation, but does not leave a durable, dated revocation marker in that slot. The PIP describes a different application pattern for evidence that must survive pruning: retain a slot whose current root commits to a revocation registry. The registry’s meaning and supporting data remain the application’s responsibility.</p><h2>A matching hash still leaves questions to answer</h2><p>Comparing external bytes with the committed digest can establish integrity under the chosen hashing convention. It does not prove that a document’s statements are true, that an address belongs to a named person or that the external file will remain available. The optional location is untrusted input, and consensus does not fetch or interpret it. One commitment can represent many items through an off-chain Merkle tree, but the files and inclusion proofs still travel outside the chain.</p><p>There is also a difference between state commitment and the answer on a screen. PIP-50 does not give GetAnchor a proof against the state root. A client querying someone else’s RPC server or explorer therefore trusts that service’s answer; the method alone does not remove that trust. Berlin’s design is useful because it separates a current account statement from historical receipts. Reading it accurately also means keeping document integrity, identity, time, availability and the source of the query response as separate questions.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://pactus.org/2026/10/28/pactus-1.17.0-berlin-released/">Pactus 1.17.0 (Berlin) Released</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/pactus-project/pactus/releases/tag/v1.17.0">Pactus v1.17.0 release</a></li><li><a href="https://pips.pactus.org/PIPs/pip-50">PIP-50: Native State Anchoring</a></li><li><a href="https://pips.pactus.org/PIPs/pip-51">PIP-51: Protocol Upgrade Mechanism</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/pactus-project/pactus/blob/v1.17.0/execution/executor/anchor.go">Anchor executor — v1.17.0</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Oracle’s Besu Platform: EVM Code, Different Permissions</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/oracle-besu-evm-permissioned-network</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/oracle-besu-evm-permissioned-network</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Oracle’s 26.3.1 announcement describes an enterprise platform around Besu. Its architecture separates contract execution from admission, signing, release approval and the SQL copy of ledger history.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/oracle-besu-evm-permissioned-network.webp" alt="Oracle’s Besu Platform: EVM Code, Different Permissions" /></p><p>Oracle’s 26.3.1 announcement describes an enterprise platform around Besu. Its architecture separates contract execution from admission, signing, release approval and the SQL copy of ledger history.</p><h2>A release announcement with a limited scope</h2><p>On October 27, 2026, Oracle published an overview of Blockchain Platform Enterprise Edition release 26.3.1. The announcement describes an integrated stack for permissioned digital-asset applications and states **Limited Availability in October 2026**. It is a product announcement with a restricted availability label, not evidence that the described applications have already gone live at particular financial institutions.</p><p>The release number also matters when reading the headline. Oracle’s earlier 26.2 documentation already lists Besu validators using QBFT, Ethereum JSON-RPC access and a custodial wallet service. Besu, QBFT and custodial signing should therefore not be presented as first appearing in this announcement. The useful question is how the platform’s documented controls fit together.</p><h2>Compatible instructions, a separate ledger</h2><p>The 26.3 architecture runs Solidity contracts in the Ethereum Virtual Machine, or EVM. It exposes Ethereum-style interfaces through an RPC Proxy, the service through which applications submit requests. But the same documentation describes **permissioned, private Ethereum networks**, with their own Besu instances and node roles.</p><p>Execution compatibility and network membership are different properties. Using the EVM does not, by itself, place a transaction on public Ethereum. In this design, the transaction goes to the configured Besu network. To understand the application, a reader needs to know who operates that network and who may participate, as well as which contract language it accepts.</p><h2>Signing a request is not agreeing on a block</h2><p>Oracle separates the jobs. The RPC Proxy resolves the caller’s organization and applies platform access controls. Universal Wallet as a Service, or UWaaS, provides custodial wallet and policy services; an instance-level wallet service handles Besu-specific signing and broadcast operations. The signing service manages keys on behalf of users rather than requiring the application to handle private keys directly.</p><p>Besu validators then use QBFT to agree on blocks. Oracle describes approved organizations sharing validation and deterministic finality for committed transactions, within the protocol’s fault-tolerance limits. A valid signature, permission to make a request and agreement on its place in the ledger are distinct parts of this path. Calling the result “EVM-compatible” does not identify who controls any of them.</p><h2>Contract release has its own approval path</h2><p>The announcement describes a **governed deployment mode** in which contracts start inactive. They become active after the configured approvals have been recorded on-chain through a Governance contract. The same approval path applies to upgrades. This is a mode and policy that an organization selects and operates, not a claim that every Solidity contract automatically receives these controls.</p><p>The contract registry keeps versioned artifacts such as the ABI, bytecode and storage layout. These describe how software calls a contract, what code is deployed and how its state is arranged. They give reviewers a specific implementation to approve and help interpret historical state. That release approval is a separate decision from the validators’ agreement on blocks.</p><h2>SQL history is a view of the ledger</h2><p>Rich History can copy and index blockchain transactions, events, traces and state in Oracle Database or MySQL. Administrators can query the data with SQL and combine it with off-chain business records for reporting or reconciliation. The 26.3 overview explicitly makes Rich History and archive nodes **optional**.</p><p>The architecture distinguishes this historical view from execution and consensus: validators agree on blocks; Rich History components consume ledger information. Consortium members may share a database provided by the founder or keep separate databases connected to their own nodes. A SQL result is therefore a query of captured history, not a new round of validator agreement.</p><h2>Read the controls, not just the compatibility label</h2><p>Oracle’s announcement is useful as a concrete example of several independent choices around familiar contract code: network participation, key custody, contract release approval and historical queries. Its documentation explains the intended platform behavior. Neither the availability statement nor the architectural description establishes a particular institution’s production rollout, and neither makes these private networks part of public Ethereum. Those boundaries are essential to understanding what was announced.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://blogs.oracle.com/blockchain/oracle-blockchain-platform-enterprise-edition-brings-governed-digital-asset-applications-to-hyperledger-besu">OBP Enterprise Edition 26.3.1: governed digital asset applications</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.oracle.com/en/database/other-databases/blockchain-enterprise/26.3/bceba/oracle-blockchain-platform-enterprise-edition-besu-overview.html">OBP Enterprise Edition overview — Release 26.3</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.oracle.com/en/database/other-databases/blockchain-enterprise/26.2/besuobpee/getting-started.html">Getting started with OBP Enterprise Edition for Hyperledger Besu — Release 26.2</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.oracle.com/en/database/other-databases/blockchain-enterprise/26.3/bceba/create-rich-history-database-configuration.html">Create a Rich History database configuration — Release 26.3</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Uniswap Aggregator Hooks: When Many Pairs Share One Pool</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/uniswap-aggregator-hooks-shared-liquidity</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/uniswap-aggregator-hooks-shared-liquidity</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[A route can look like a Uniswap v4 pool while using liquidity elsewhere. The October expansion makes that distinction practical: different pairs may draw on the same underlying pool, and the API has its own routing contract.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/uniswap-aggregator-hooks-shared-liquidity.webp" alt="Uniswap Aggregator Hooks: When Many Pairs Share One Pool" /></p><p>A route can look like a Uniswap v4 pool while using liquidity elsewhere. The October expansion makes that distinction practical: different pairs may draw on the same underlying pool, and the API has its own routing contract.</p><h2>The pool label is only the entrance</h2><p>On October 22, 2026, Uniswap Labs announced that Aggregator Hooks were live in its Web App and API on Ethereum mainnet, Base and Robinhood Chain. The mechanism wraps external liquidity sources in a v4 interface. A router can therefore encounter a v4 pool whose swap is carried out against liquidity elsewhere. This is the publisher’s availability statement; this article does not independently verify deployments on each chain.</p><p>October was an expansion, not the first launch. On March 18, Labs had already described the first live deployment on Tempo: an aggregator hook exposing the chain’s native stablecoin DEX as a set of v4 pools. The interface brought another source into the routing system without making that source an ordinary native v4 pool.</p><h2>Several pairs can share the same reserves</h2><p>The public implementation makes the distinction concrete. BaseAggregatorHook rejects attempts to add liquidity through its core v4 add-liquidity callback. Its swap callback instead invokes the hook’s settlement path. This code explains the adapter design; its presence in a repository does not prove that every listed integration is live on every announced chain.</p><p>Curve provides a useful example. The repository documents one hook per underlying Curve pool, with a separate v4 pair for each token combination. Its eight-token example produces **28 pairs**, all using the same hook and the same underlying pool. That is an illustration of the mapping, not a report of a specific deployed eight-token pool.</p><p>Those 28 pair views are not 28 independent sets of reserves. A swap changes the shared pool, affecting other directions involving a touched token. A routing system that visits the same source more than once has to account for that shared state; counting pair labels cannot establish independent liquidity.</p><p>The rule depends on the adapter. For V2-compatible sources, a single hook can serve many distinct external pairs, locating each through a factory and its two tokens. V3-compatible mappings also use the relevant fee tier or tick spacing. A repeated hook address identifies a shared Curve pool in the documented Curve design; it is not a universal test for shared reserves.</p><h2>The linked API path is an opt-in beta</h2><p>The expansion post says the Web App includes external liquidity automatically. Its API links lead to the **Guidestar Routing (Beta)** documentation. That beta currently supports same-chain EXACT_INPUT swaps between two different tokens on Ethereum, Base and Robinhood Chain. EXACT_INPUT means the input amount is fixed. This is the documented API scope, not a limitation inferred for every aggregator-hook contract.</p><p>Explicit opt-in requires both x-api-experimental: true and x-universal-router-swapsteps: true. The swapsteps header alone does not request Guidestar. Guidestar returns CLASSIC AMM quotes using BEST_PRICE routing; it does not consider UniswapX even when UniswapX is included alongside AMM protocols in the request.</p><p>An explicitly requested Guidestar quote **never falls back automatically** to standard routing. Unsupported requests return HTTP 400; a supported request for which it finds no quote returns HTTP 404. During beta, the documentation advises requesting a standard quote separately in parallel, without those two headers. That is an integration choice the caller must implement.</p><h2>An empty route array can still describe a route</h2><p>A Guidestar response leaves quote.route as an empty array. Its execution sequence appears in **quote.swapSteps**, which integrations should use to display or validate the route. The presence of swapSteps identifies a Guidestar quote. The separate quote.routeString is free-form debugging text, not a stable path format to parse.</p><p>Reading the route therefore takes more than counting pools or checking one familiar field. The useful questions are which underlying source is being used, whether another pair touches the same state, which engine produced the response and whether it actually returned a quote. The hook mapping and the API response answer different parts of that picture.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://blog.uniswap.org/aggregator-hooks-are-now-live">Aggregator Hooks are Now Live</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.uniswap.org/uniswap-is-live-on-tempo">Uniswap is Live on Tempo</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/Uniswap/v4-hooks-public/blob/2264ac8b023011fdca8fd3422ada172dc10184e0/src/aggregator-hooks/README.md">Aggregator Hooks: Curve and singleton pool mappings (pinned source)</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/Uniswap/v4-hooks-public/blob/2264ac8b023011fdca8fd3422ada172dc10184e0/src/aggregator-hooks/BaseAggregatorHook.sol">BaseAggregatorHook: liquidity and swap callbacks (pinned source)</a></li><li><a href="https://developers.uniswap.org/docs/trading/swapping-api/amm-vs-uniswapx-routing#guidestar-routing-beta">AMM vs UniswapX Routing — Guidestar Routing (Beta)</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Cronos v1.8: Reading an Empty Pending-Transaction Feed</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/cronos-v18-pending-transaction-views</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/cronos-v18-pending-transaction-views</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Cronos’s upgrade checkpoint has passed. Its optional application-side mempool changes where pending transactions can be seen—and what an empty response actually means.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/cronos-v18-pending-transaction-views.webp" alt="Cronos v1.8: Reading an Empty Pending-Transaction Feed" /></p><p>Cronos’s upgrade checkpoint has passed. Its optional application-side mempool changes where pending transactions can be seen—and what an empty response actually means.</p><h2>A checkpoint has passed; the records have different meanings</h2><p>Cronos scheduled its EVM v1.8 mainnet upgrade for October 22, 2026. There is now more to inspect than that date: Chainstack’s maintenance notice names block 101,485,000 and records completion at 08:00 UTC. Cronos Explorer displays that block with a 07:52:24 UTC timestamp, and block 101,485,001 points back to its hash. The announced checkpoint has been crossed in the explorer’s history.</p><p>Those observations have limits. The block timestamp is a chain record; 08:00 is the provider’s maintenance entry, not a measured network-wide activation instant. CoinYQ did not independently verify the running software version across validators. A maintenance badge alone does not establish which options every operator enabled.</p><p>The release status has changed since this article’s first publication. On October 22, GitHub now shows v1.8.0 as Latest, with prerelease=false in the release API. The record retains its September 24 publication date and reports an October 22 update at 12:40:42 UTC; that field does not identify the exact label-change time or a network activation instant. The release still warns against an immediate binary swap. This is a change in publishing status, not independent proof of the software running on validators.</p><h2>Two views of one node’s waiting room</h2><p>One option has a consequence that readers of transaction feeds can easily miss. A mempool holds transactions waiting to enter a block. Previously, Cronos used the CometBFT consensus layer’s pool; v1.8 lets an operator give that job to the application instead. The migration guide describes this as an opt-in change, with existing configurations continuing to work.</p><p>The choice changes the window through which the queue is visible. In app mode, CometBFT’s /unconfirmed_txs and /num_unconfirmed_txs return no pending entries; eth_newPendingTransactionFilter and the pending filter also return nothing, according to the guide. The txpool_content and txpool_status methods read the application pool instead. In flood mode, CometBFT’s pending view works while those txpool methods see an empty application pool. An empty result from one interface therefore cannot, by itself, establish that the node has no waiting transactions.</p><h2>Moving work before the block, and parallelizing work inside it</h2><p>Why move the pool at all? Cronos’s announcement describes shared work between admission and block construction, with less repeated verification. Revalidation after a block can run in the background rather than compete on the consensus path. This is a change to how work is organized before the next block, not evidence that a submitted transaction has already been included or finalized.</p><p>Block-STM addresses another stage: executing transactions within a block in parallel and re-executing affected transactions when conflicts are detected. Cronos recommends it in the migration guide, but the documented block-executor default is sequential. The software version, the selected pool and the selected execution mode are separate pieces of information. Enabling the application pool also needs a compatible capacity setting; the documented disabled value, max-txs = -1, cannot be paired with app mode.</p><h2>What the upgrade does not settle by itself</h2><p>Other release headlines need the same care. The October 14 announcement describes libp2p support as experimental and not yet enabled on mainnet; the presence of that code in v1.8 does not establish later activation. The migration guide likewise says the 16,777,216 per-transaction gas cap needs a separate governance change rather than taking effect at the upgrade height. We have not verified either subsequent change here.</p><p>For anyone building a dashboard or investigating a waiting transaction, the practical question is which pool the endpoint exposes. The guide tells operators to retain flood mode for consumers that need the older pending view, or move consumers to txpool methods with that namespace enabled. The new checkpoint makes this operational distinction timely. It does not turn an empty feed into proof of a quiet network, nor substitute for measurements of actual execution and query latency.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://blog.cronos.com/p/cronos-evm-mainnet-v18-upgrade">Cronos Labs — Cronos EVM Mainnet v1.8 Upgrade</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/blob/v1.8.0/docs/migrations/v1.7-to-v1.8.md">Cronos v1.8.0 — migration guide, pending-transaction views and defaults</a></li><li><a href="https://status.chainstack.com/cmvgohmd903471np047nsn5wo">Chainstack — Cronos Mainnet Upgrade maintenance record</a></li><li><a href="https://explorer.cronos.com/block/101485000">Cronos Explorer — block 101,485,000</a></li><li><a href="https://explorer.cronos.com/block/101485001">Cronos Explorer — block 101,485,001 and parent hash</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos/releases/tag/v1.8.0">Cronos — v1.8.0 release notes</a></li><li><a href="https://api.github.com/repos/crypto-org-chain/cronos/releases/tags/v1.8.0">GitHub release API: v1.8.0 publishing status and timestamps</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Solana’s Alpenglow: The Handoff Before Faster Finality</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/solana-alpenglow-consensus-handoff</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/solana-alpenglow-consensus-handoff</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Solana’s Alpenglow handoff now has a public record. Two RPC services returned the same genesis certificate and linked finalized blocks; those records establish more than a launch countdown.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/solana-alpenglow-consensus-handoff.webp" alt="Solana’s Alpenglow: The Handoff Before Faster Finality" /></p><p>Solana’s Alpenglow handoff now has a public record. Two RPC services returned the same genesis certificate and linked finalized blocks; those records establish more than a launch countdown.</p><h2>Before the new engine starts</h2><p>At 06:01 UTC on October 21, 2026, Solana’s public mainnet RPC had no Alpenglow genesis certificate to return. At 14:11 UTC, it did. A second service, PublicNode, returned the same certificate at 14:12 UTC. Anza’s page now marks mainnet-beta completed, and the Foundation’s activation table says Active. The handoff described before launch now has observable records: a common history from which validators could change the rules for agreeing on what comes next.</p><p>SIMD-0384 explains why that common history matters. Its aim is to avoid rolling back user transactions confirmed under TowerBFT. The fixed repository snapshot used here labels the migration and Alpenglow proposals “Review”; that is the status of those design documents, not a measurement of the running network. The October 21 RPC records and current official status supply the operational evidence.</p><h2>A boundary that stops accepting user transactions</h2><p>Under the described procedure, activating the feature does not immediately switch consensus. The migration boundary sits 5,000 slots after the feature’s activation slot. From that boundary, blocks accept only simple vote transactions. RPC commitment updates and TowerBFT rooting also pause. This creates an interval in which the network can establish its handoff without adding ordinary user transactions to the blocks that may be discarded.</p><p>Validators then look for a boundary-or-later block whose immediately following child contains votes for it from at least 82% of stake. Its most recent ancestor before the boundary becomes the candidate Alpenglow genesis block. A second agreement, BLS genesis votes representing at least 82% of stake, produces the genesis certificate. That certificate identifies the common starting history for the new consensus.</p><h2>One history, a different way to agree</h2><p>Under the migration design, validators verify the certificate, reset to its genesis block, initialize Votor and resume user transactions. Initial Alpenglow blocks carry the certificate, and replay records it in an on-chain account. Anza described an expected handoff of hundreds of milliseconds. The records collected here do not measure that duration; they show the agreed starting block and the finalized chain that follows it.</p><p>Votor’s ordinary voting thresholds are different from the migration’s 82%. One round can finalize with 80% of stake; a two-round route works with 60%. The routes operate concurrently. Votes travel directly between validators and signatures can be aggregated into certificates, instead of each consensus vote needing its own on-chain transaction. The change concerns how validators establish agreement, not simply how quickly a wallet draws a check mark.</p><h2>What the 150ms figure leaves open</h2><p>The original May 2025 introduction expected a median finality of about 150 milliseconds. It explicitly based that number on simulations using the then-current mainnet stake distribution, excluding computation overhead. A median is not a maximum, and a simulated consensus latency is not a measurement of every user’s complete journey through a wallet, RPC service and application.</p><p>There is also a scope boundary inside the Alpenglow name. SIMD-0326 covers Votor while retaining Turbine for data distribution initially; Rotor, the proposed replacement distribution system, is excluded and needs a later proposal. Anza’s current page likewise lists Rotor as future work. Reading the original full-protocol performance discussion as a promise that every component arrives with this migration would miss that distinction.</p><h2>The handoff is visible; its speed is a separate question</h2><p>Both the official mainnet RPC and PublicNode reported epoch 1064 and solana-core 4.3.2. Their getAgGenesisCert results were identical, including the block identifier, aggregate signature and signer bitmap. The certificate names slot 459,652,999. The published evidence file preserves the requests and responses collected from 14:11 to 14:13 UTC. Matching responses corroborate the observation across two providers; CoinYQ did not independently verify the BLS signature against the epoch’s validator keys.</p><p>The finalized block records connect that certificate’s slot to what followed. Both providers returned the same blockhash for 459,652,999 and the same successor at 459,653,008. The successor names 459,652,999 as its parent and repeats that parent’s blockhash. Their blockTime fields correspond to 13:54:00 and 13:54:03 UTC on October 21. Solana defines blockTime as estimated production time: these values are not the exact instant consensus switched, and their three-second difference is not a measured outage or migration duration.</p><p>The numbers distinguish three roles. The scheduled migration boundary was 459,653,000; the observed certificate points one slot earlier; the returned finalized child is 459,653,008. SIMD-0384 defines the genesis block as the last TowerBFT block before the boundary that becomes the parent of the first Alpenglow block. The observed parent relationship fits that definition. We use the returned values rather than treating the guide’s illustrative genesis slot as an actual measurement.</p><p>The certificate, linked finalized blocks and official completion notice support an observed mainnet handoff. They do not establish 150ms finality for real user traffic. Before migration, a supported getAgGenesisCert call can return null; an older RPC’s -32601 error is a different result. After migration, the useful next evidence is measured behavior under load. Faster agreement has acquired a shared starting record, while its performance remains a separate question.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://www.anza.xyz/alpenglow">Anza — Alpenglow launch and migration overview</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/blob/749dc8635821383c5c259d616e337687707f3ef9/proposals/0384-alpenglow-migration.md">SIMD-0384 — Alpenglow migration, repository snapshot</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/blob/749dc8635821383c5c259d616e337687707f3ef9/proposals/0326-alpenglow.md">SIMD-0326 — Alpenglow scope and voting</a></li><li><a href="https://www.anza.xyz/blog/alpenglow-a-new-consensus-for-solana">Alpenglow: A New Consensus for Solana</a></li><li><a href="https://solana.com/upgrades/alpenglow">Solana Foundation — Alpenglow rollout and migration checks</a></li><li><a href="https://solana.com/docs/rpc/http/getaggenesiscert">Solana RPC — getAgGenesisCert</a></li><li><a href="https://coinyq.com/evidence/solana-alpenglow-2026-10-21-0601-rpc.json">CoinYQ — public mainnet RPC observation, October 21 at 06:01 UTC</a></li><li><a href="https://coinyq.com/evidence/solana-alpenglow-2026-10-21-transition-rpc.json">CoinYQ — cross-provider Alpenglow certificate and finalized-block observations</a></li><li><a href="https://solana.com/docs/rpc/json-structures#confirmed-blocks">Solana RPC — confirmed-block fields and estimated block time</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Celestia Fibre: Where the Data Goes After v10</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/celestia-fibre-data-and-onchain-receipts</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/celestia-fibre-data-and-onchain-receipts</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Celestia’s v10 transition is visible in block headers. Fibre sends bulk data to validator servers and records signed evidence on-chain. What does that evidence establish?]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/celestia-fibre-data-and-onchain-receipts.webp" alt="Celestia Fibre: Where the Data Goes After v10" /></p><p>Celestia’s v10 transition is visible in block headers. Fibre sends bulk data to validator servers and records signed evidence on-chain. What does that evidence establish?</p><h2>A change visible between two blocks</h2><p>Celestia’s v10 transition now has a checkable boundary. CoinYQ queried QuickNode and ITRocket on October 20, 2026. Both returned app version 9 for block 15,116,658 and version 10 for the next block, 15,116,659, timestamped 03:45:49 UTC. The providers also returned the same block hashes. Celestia’s official status page separately announced that v10 was live and operators could begin setting up Fibre servers.</p><p>This is stronger evidence than the presence of a new executable. The October 7 v10.4.0 release could run the older application until the upgrade activated. The observed boundary establishes the app-version change; it does not measure Fibre traffic or show that every validator has a working Fibre endpoint. Those are separate operational questions.</p><h2>The large payload takes a separate route</h2><p>Fibre gives data availability its own delivery path. Its client encodes a blob into recoverable pieces and sends those pieces to validator-operated Fibre servers. The protocol avoids requiring every server to hold the entire original blob. A reader with the blob’s identifier can request enough pieces to reconstruct it and verify the result against its cryptographic commitment, under the protocol’s honesty assumptions.</p><p>A useful analogy is a delivery with a compact receipt: the receipt identifies the consignment without containing everything in it. Fibre similarly keeps the bulk data out of Celestia’s ordinary data square. What reaches the chain is a payment promise containing the commitment, accompanied by validator endorsements. The analogy describes the separation of jobs, not a guarantee that a paper receipt alone makes data retrievable.</p><h2>What the validators actually endorse</h2><p>Before uploading, a user funds a Fibre escrow account. The client sends data pieces together with a payment promise signed by that account’s owner. Each server checks its pieces and the promise, then endorses the promise using its validator key. Once endorsements represent more than two-thirds of voting power, a PayForFibre transaction can settle the payment on-chain. This threshold is weighted by voting power, not by counting servers.</p><p>The chain verifies the required evidence and charges the escrow. This record connects a commitment, payment promise and validator endorsements; it does not put all the original bytes inside the block. Readers still use Fibre to download them. There is also a separate timeout path: an expired, unsettled promise can be charged without validator endorsements, even if the upload never completed. A payment promise should not be mistaken for a promise to charge only after successful delivery.</p><h2>Availability has a time window</h2><p>Fibre’s client documentation explicitly describes a limited retention window, controlled by a chain parameter, with servers free to keep data longer. Applications that need a durable history must retrieve and preserve it elsewhere. A permanent chain record is not a promise that the associated data pieces remain on every server forever.</p><p>There is also work after activation. Operators run a separate Fibre service and register its address; clients discover servers through that registry. The October 20 setup notice addresses precisely this stage. A v10 block, a registered endpoint and a successful upload-and-download cycle are distinct observations. This article confirms the first, without claiming network-wide readiness for the others.</p><h2>How to read the 3 Tb/s headline</h2><p>Celestia’s October 1 report described 3.07 terabits per second averaged over a 143-second window with 120 AWS validators, counting blob data that had reached on-chain confirmation. It used a performance branch: 2 GiB blobs instead of the initial mainnet setting of 128 MiB, one-second blocks and a higher per-block settlement limit. It was an experiment with stated conditions, not an observed mainnet throughput figure.</p><p>The useful change is the separation itself: validator servers move and retain the large payload, while the chain settles a smaller signed record. The newly observed v10 boundary makes that design relevant to mainnet. Whether applications can use it reliably at scale will be answered by actual upload, retrieval and retention results, rather than by carrying a laboratory throughput number over unchanged.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://status.celestia.org/incidents/01M5CQXVMSRDRP7QTZYG7DABCS">Celestia — V10 is live: Mainnet Beta Fibre server setup</a></li><li><a href="https://public-endpoint.celestia-mainnet.quiknode.pro/blockchain?minHeight=15116658&amp;maxHeight=15116660">QuickNode public RPC — Celestia block headers 15,116,658–15,116,660</a></li><li><a href="https://celestia-mainnet-rpc.itrocket.net/block?height=15116659">ITRocket public RPC — Celestia block 15,116,659</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/celestiaorg/celestia-app/releases/tag/v10.4.0">Celestia App v10.4.0 — mainnet release notes</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/celestiaorg/celestia-app/blob/5187d2fb5eb8bc4b534c74724882943c54253ae9/fibre/README.md">Fibre client — publishing, retrieval and retention (v10.4.0 source)</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/celestiaorg/celestia-app/blob/5187d2fb5eb8bc4b534c74724882943c54253ae9/x/fibre/README.md">x/fibre — payment promises and validator endorsements (v10.4.0 source)</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.celestia.org/operate/consensus-validators/fibre/">Celestia documentation — running a Fibre server</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.celestia.org/celestia-fibre-hits-3-tb-s/">Celestia Fibre hits 3 Tb/s</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>Filecoin Solstice: What Is the Block Reward Paying For?</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/filecoin-solstice-block-rewards-and-paid-services</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/filecoin-solstice-block-rewards-and-paid-services</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Solstice changes how Filecoin weights storage and divides newly minted block rewards. A 10× power multiplier, a service budget and a payment-volume test each measure something different.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/filecoin-solstice-block-rewards-and-paid-services.webp" alt="Filecoin Solstice: What Is the Block Reward Paying For?" /></p><p>Solstice changes how Filecoin weights storage and divides newly minted block rewards. A 10× power multiplier, a service budget and a payment-volume test each measure something different.</p><h2>One reward, more than one job</h2><p>Filecoin has crossed its Solstice upgrade boundary. At 13:05 UTC on October 19, 2026, CoinYQ’s read-only check of the public GLIF Mainnet RPC returned network version 29 at epoch 6,470,291 and the released v19.0.1 reward actor code. The announced boundary was epoch 6,470,279 at 12:59:30 UTC; 13:05 is our observation time. The change behind nv29, FIP-0118, poses a practical question: what job should a newly minted block reward pay for?</p><p>Update — October 19, 2026: Filecoin Status posted the Solstice maintenance as completed at 13:59 UTC. This is the publication time of the official completion notice, distinct from the on-chain observation above. The notice does not establish economic effects or successful migration for every user.</p><p>The change first separates storage content from the weight assigned to new storage sectors. Under the released rules, every new sector gets the maximum quality-adjusted power, or QAP, irrespective of what it contains. DataCap and verified-registry writes stop. The old route that linked a higher sector weight to verified allocations no longer determines the weight of new sectors.</p><h2>Ten times the weight is not ten times the storage</h2><p>QAP is a protocol accounting weight. The released actor code gives a sector with the full-power flag ten times its raw size in this calculation. A 32 GiB sector therefore has 320 GiB of quality-adjusted power, while still representing 32 GiB of physical sector capacity. This is arithmetic applied to a weight, not evidence that more customer files appeared, that ten copies were made, or that downloads became faster.</p><p>Existing sectors do not all jump to the new weight at the transition. They retain their recorded power; eligible sectors can use a separate upgrade path. Raising that weight can require additional pledge collateral and an adjusted daily fee. The distinction matters when reading a network chart: a change in weighted power can reflect a rule change or a sector upgrade rather than an equal increase in stored data.</p><h2>A small new branch in the reward budget</h2><p>The Mainnet bootstrap parameters start the consensus stream at 95% and the service stream at 5%. The consensus weight follows a linear decline toward 50% over nine protocol quarters. These quarters are fixed epoch windows, counted from activation, rather than calendar quarters. During the first, bootstrap quarter, the service weight grows with the part leaving consensus, reaching 10%. The percentages divide newly minted block rewards; gas rewards still go to the winning miner.</p><p>After that bootstrap phase, an additional five-percentage-point service increase requires the relevant quarter’s qualifying Filecoin Pay volume to meet the specified target. A missed target leaves the service weight unchanged. It cannot exceed the portion available after consensus. If consensus keeps declining while the service share does not grow enough to fill the gap, the unallocated remainder is burned. A larger service budget is therefore not simply promised by the passage of another quarter.</p><h2>Who receives the service share?</h2><p>The service stream is for registered Service Orchestrators: organizations that develop paid demand through such work as integrations, customer onboarding and service infrastructure. It is not a payment automatically sent to everyone storing a file or holding FIL. The reward actor accrues the allocated amounts; a separate claim step pays the registered recipients. Accrued entitlement and a completed withdrawal are separate records, and neither alone shows how the money was subsequently spent.</p><p>Payment volume also needs a careful reading. The input comes from qualifying Filecoin Pay settlement events, but an off-chain indexer computes the figures, including the specified currency conversion. Orchestrators post their values; a verification window allows governance to correct them before they bind. Later distribution uses these bound figures. Calling the whole measurement process an automatic on-chain verdict on customer demand would leave out the reporting and review work.</p><h2>The next useful evidence is a record of service</h2><p>Solstice’s reporting runbook asks orchestrators to distinguish accrued rewards from claimed rewards and to disclose how funds were used. That gives readers concrete questions for later quarters: which qualifying settlements were counted, how were those figures checked, what was actually withdrawn, and what service work followed? A changed allocation rule can make those questions more visible; it cannot answer them before the activity happens.</p><p>The change is best read as a new way to fund two different jobs: keeping the consensus system running and developing paid services on it. The observed nv29 and reward actor establish that the transition occurred. This article explains the released rules; it does not measure customer growth, individual payouts or investment returns. Demonstrating useful demand will require the records produced afterward.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://status.filecoin.io/incidents/3vgg32xmj6nt">Filecoin Status — MainNet Version 29, Solstice</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus/releases/tag/miner/v1.37.0">Lotus miner/v1.37.0: Solstice release</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/FIPs/blob/23b42964890590a49c9cbc6e19a7e9e361d1f8a0/FIPS/fip-0118.md">FIP-0118: accepted specification, October 5 revision</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus/blob/e04ba2167b80db541643b54fae8f1765caefd515/build/buildconstants/params_mainnet.go">Lotus: released Mainnet bootstrap parameters</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/builtin-actors/blob/913a3da910e83f3a5ba1e7bd5a9340b824114a97/actors/miner/src/policy.rs">Actors v19.0.1: sector quality and maximum power</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/builtin-actors/blob/913a3da910e83f3a5ba1e7bd5a9340b824114a97/actors/reward/src/streams/award.rs">Actors v19.0.1: block reward allocation and accrual</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/solstice-governance/blob/80f88a83bcd7f6cdbb4df609f65fff1313d824d7/docs/02-solstice-program-governance.md">Solstice governance: responsibilities and update rules</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/solstice-governance/blob/80f88a83bcd7f6cdbb4df609f65fff1313d824d7/docs/04-quarterly-review-and-runbook.md">Solstice: quarterly reporting and verification runbook</a></li><li><a href="https://coinyq.com/stories/filecoin-solstice-block-rewards-and-paid-services-activation.json">CoinYQ read-only GLIF RPC observations and activation-boundary records</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/filecoin-project/lotus/blob/e04ba2167b80db541643b54fae8f1765caefd515/build/builtin_actors_gen.go">Lotus: Mainnet v19.0.1 bundle and reward actor code</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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    <title>IoTeX Zanzibar: Who Calculates the Voter’s Reward?</title>
    <link>https://coinyq.com/stories/iotex-zanzibar-voter-rewards-inside-consensus</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://coinyq.com/stories/iotex-zanzibar-voter-rewards-inside-consensus</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[A reward transfer already left a record on IoTeX. Zanzibar moves the calculation and distribution into the chain’s rules—with snapshots, eligibility checks and work spread across blocks.]]></description>
    <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://coinyq.com/stories/iotex-zanzibar-voter-rewards-inside-consensus.webp" alt="IoTeX Zanzibar: Who Calculates the Voter’s Reward?" /></p><p>A reward transfer already left a record on IoTeX. Zanzibar moves the calculation and distribution into the chain’s rules—with snapshots, eligibility checks and work spread across blocks.</p><h2>Before a reward reaches the wallet</h2><p>A reward in a wallet is the end of a longer calculation: which stake counted, which delegate it supported, what share that delegate assigned to voters, and where the payment should go. IoTeX’s Hermes service automated this work for participating delegates. Its distributions already used a smart contract and left on-chain records. Calling Zanzibar the first time those rewards became visible on the chain would miss the change.</p><p>Zanzibar moves the calculation and distribution for participating delegates into the protocol itself. Validators derive the result from committed state as part of processing the chain, rather than depending on a separate service to calculate and submit each distribution. This is the idea behind IIP-59: bringing the work that precedes a payment into the rules that nodes reproduce.</p><h2>The clock was an estimate; the block is a record</h2><p>The Mainnet activation point was block 53,533,081. IoTeXScan records that block at 02:28:37 UTC on October 19, 2026. The released code sets Zanzibar, Zanzibar Beta and Zanzibar Gamma to the same height. That block record supports activation having been reached; the previously announced 02:00 UTC was an estimate, not the observed block time.</p><p>There was a schedule change along the way. A September 24 documentation commit moved the target from block 53,155,801, estimated for October 8, to the later height. The October 4 v2.5.1 maintenance release kept the new schedule. Mainnet receives the Beta and Gamma corrections together with Zanzibar, while Testnet had activated these stages separately. A release date, an estimated fork time and a recorded activation block describe different steps.</p><h2>Freeze the inputs, then share the work</h2><p>The reward process has an accumulation phase and a settlement phase. The delegate’s portion is paid immediately; the voter portion collects in a pool associated with that delegate. At a reward-era boundary, the system fixes the inputs needed for settlement, including delegate settings and staking state. The released configuration makes an era 24 epochs. It does not promise a fixed clock-hour payment schedule.</p><p>Payments then proceed in bounded chunks across subsequent blocks. The released default limits a chunk to 256 distinct voters, spreading the work instead of fitting an entire distribution into one block. A snapshot keeps the calculation tied to the relevant earlier state while staking continues to change. As a mental model, it is a fixed allocation sheet worked through in batches: a later edit to the live ledger does not silently rewrite the sheet already being settled.</p><h2>One fork does not put everyone on the same path</h2><p>The automatic Hermes migration is a one-time operation at activation. It selects candidates using the configured Hermes vault reward addresses and requires both voter-reward portion fields in DelegateProfile. A candidate missing that configuration stays on the existing Hermes path. Other candidates can opt in through an owner-authorized action. The release note’s earlier survey of candidates describes a pre-fork snapshot, not an audited count of who actually migrated on October 19.</p><p>A voter’s calculated contributions from different delegates can be combined into one payment. The routing code can credit the configured destination account or deposit the amount into an eligible native staking bucket when auto-deposit conditions are met. These are different destinations for an allocated reward. Simply holding IOTX does not establish participation, a reward amount or an automatic-compounding entitlement.</p><h2>What activation tells us—and what comes next</h2><p>The activation block and released rules establish that the scheduled transition point has been reached. They do not establish that every eligible voter has already been paid. Era boundaries, staged processing and delegate configuration remain relevant after the fork. This article verifies the activation record and explains the released design; it does not audit individual payouts or measure realized returns.</p><p>For a particular payment, the useful questions are concrete: did the delegate enter the new mode, what settings and stake were frozen for that settlement, and what credit or deposit was recorded? Zanzibar makes that chain of calculation part of shared execution. The value of the change is that the path from eligible stake to recorded payment can be examined against common rules, while those rules still determine who receives what.</p><h2>Sources</h2><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/iotexproject/iotex-bootstrap/blob/f55a6702674e7d9c1b5dfbea6c8e13a22622e089/changelog/v2.5.0-release-note.md">Zanzibar release note: September 24 revision</a></li><li><a href="https://iotexscan.io/block/53533081">Activation block 53,533,081</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/iotexproject/iips/blob/1cd2d37ff5dec4a9db09b4fa86cf18e435cd9203/iip-59.md">IIP-59 design: protocol-native voter reward distribution (Draft)</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/iotexproject/iotex-core/blob/v2.5.1/blockchain/genesis/genesis.go">v2.5.1 genesis code: fork heights and reward parameters</a></li><li><a href="https://docs.iotex.io/blockchain/build/web3-development/evm-precompiled-contracts/hermes-delegate-rewards">Hermes: off-chain operation and on-chain distribution</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/iotexproject/iotex-core/blob/v2.5.1/action/protocol/staking/candidate_reward_migration.go">v2.5.1 code: one-time Hermes migration and profile filter</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/iotexproject/iotex-core/blob/v2.5.1/action/protocol/rewarding/voter_reward.go">v2.5.1 code: combined voter payment and destination routing</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/iotexproject/iotex-core/releases/tag/v2.5.1">v2.5.1 release: unchanged Zanzibar schedule</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/iotexproject/iotex-bootstrap/commit/f55a6702674e7d9c1b5dfbea6c8e13a22622e089">September 24 commit rescheduling Mainnet activation</a></li></ul>]]></content:encoded>
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