Cap USD

An older project also used the Cap name for synthetic trading. This asset is different. Cap USD went live for minting on 2025-08-18, and its canonical Ethereum proxy is 0xcCcc62962d17b8914c62D74FfB843d73B2a3cccC. The contract calls itself cap USD with symbol cUSD. The similarly patterned 0x88887bE419578051FF9F4eb6C858A951921D8888 address belongs to stcUSD.

That distinction separates money from a savings position. cUSD is minted and redeemed against the reserve. stcUSD is obtained by staking cUSD and is meant to collect income. Neither address identifies a bank account, a dollar deposit or ownership in Cap Labs or Covered Agents S.A.

The Vault offers two exits. burn() destroys cUSD for one selected backing asset at oracle value. Its dynamic fee rises as that asset moves away from its target reserve weight. redeem() destroys cUSD for a proportional slice of every supported asset and applies a fixed fee. Both calls carry user-set minimum output and a deadline.

The difference becomes sharp during a depeg. A proportional redemption shares the impaired asset across redeemers; it does not manufacture a dollar. Current documentation says the live fractional reserve supports USDC and deploys idle USDC through Aave V3, while broader asset examples describe the architecture’s direction. The same docs put the minimum mint fee at 10 bps, cap it at 5%, and allow authorized whitelisted users to bypass fees.

The live reserve is therefore a one-asset instance of multi-asset code, not proof that every blue-chip asset named in an overview is already accepted. Adding another backing asset requires privileged configuration and would change the contents of proportional redemption.

Idle reserves can earn through underlying assets or integrated lending strategies. Borrowers can also draw reserve assets after underwriters delegate enough collateral. Borrower interest combines a market-and-utilization hurdle with a negotiated underwriting premium. Harvested value reaches the fee machinery and stcUSD; it is not automatically added to every plain cUSD balance.

If a borrower’s health factor falls below its liquidation threshold, a grace period starts. Liquidators then repay debt and receive slashed underwriter collateral with a bonus that grows through the liquidation window. This is a first-loss mechanism for credit exposure. It still relies on collateral value, oracle output, shared-security networks and successful execution.

Cap describes two guarantee layers. Onchain, an underwriter escrows collateral for a borrower and can lose it. Offchain, those institutions may sign a guarantor agreement giving the underwriter recourse after covering a default. The agreement is optional and runs between counterparties; a cUSD holder is not thereby named as an insured bank depositor.

The limit appears in Cap’s own risk page. Reserve assets can depeg, freeze or be seized; idle funds inherit Aave or Morpho risk; bridges and oracles can fail; redemptions may be delayed at full utilization. Vault code likewise checks available balance. Even the variable named insuranceFund is an administrator-set recipient for mint and burn fees, not evidence of a regulated policy.

cUSD is a UUPS proxy, and its current implementation can be replaced by an authorized role. Cap’s published Ethereum access check places proxy upgrades, new reserve assets, fee parameters and major oracle changes behind timelock 0xD8236031d8279d82E615aF2BFab5FC0127A329ab. Developer-controlled addresses retain faster powers: the published multisig can pause, unpause, change reserve settings and whitelist users, and a developer EOA can also pause.

Covered Agents S.A., identified in the terms as a Panama corporation, operates the front end and reserves rights to modify or suspend it. The terms disclaim warranties and place digital-asset, smart-contract and shared-security risk on users. The contract supplies a conditional redemption mechanism; the documents do not turn cUSD into company equity, a dividend, a bank deposit or an unconditional legal promise to pay one fiat dollar.