Felix feUSD

The subject is the HyperEVM feUSD proxy at 0x02c6…6c70, linked to HyperCore spot through the documented system address. It is not Felix’s USDhl/HUSD product, its newer trading venue, or any unrelated FEI or FUSD ticker. Contract identity matters because the Felix brand now covers more than one financial product.

The public deployment manifest shows one feUSD token above separate WHYPE, UBTC, kHYPE and wstHYPE branches. An older user FAQ mentions only HYPE and UBTC and treats more collateral as forthcoming. That mismatch is best read as dated documentation, not permission to assume every listed branch accepts deposits now.

A borrower places one approved asset into a branch Trove, chooses an interest rate and mints feUSD while staying above that branch’s minimum collateral ratio and debt cap. The position keeps its own collateral, debt and rate, but the issued token can circulate outside the Trove.

Supply expands through borrowing, upfront charges and aggregate interest. It contracts when borrowers repay and when redemptions or liquidation settlement burn feUSD. The absence of a maximum supply is therefore part of the accounting model: the relevant limit is branch debt capacity and collateral health, not a vesting chart.

When feUSD trades below target, redemption offers a hard economic route: burn feUSD and receive a mixture of oracle-priced collateral minus a fee. CollateralRegistry allocates redemptions toward branches with more debt outside their Stability Pool, then targets Troves from lower annual rates upward.

That floor is only as operational as the collateral, feed and redemption transaction. The repository discloses stale-oracle and front-running cases. A failed, zero or stale feed can shut a branch; last-good-price handling may preserve exits in some states while also making the displayed valuation old.

A Stability Pool depositor does not merely park feUSD for interest. When a Trove falls below its branch threshold, deposited feUSD can be burned to offset the debt and the pool receives the seized collateral. If the pool is insufficient, the documented design can use just-in-time liquidation funding or redistribute debt and collateral among surviving branch borrowers.

The yield source follows the same debt book. ActivePool mints aggregate borrower interest, sends a configurable share to the branch Stability Pool and directs the rest through an incentive router. A high displayed rate can therefore combine newly minted debt interest with volatile liquidation collateral; it is not a fixed coupon funded by Felix Labs Inc.

The token’s owner read zero at review because its initial owner sets the CollateralRegistry and renounces token ownership. Minting and burning then remain callable only by registered system contracts. This narrows arbitrary ERC-20 mint access, but it does not freeze the surrounding protocol.

AdminController is the wider control surface. Its roles can propose or apply price-feed, MCR, CCR, yield, debt-cap, router and implementation changes, add branches, and invoke emergency shutdown or later resume. The live proxy points to implementation 0x4443…2598. Public sources did not resolve every role holder, so claims of completed immutability would run ahead of the evidence.

The Terms identify Felix Labs Inc as interface operator while putting token transactions and smart-contract outcomes on users. They also deny governance and membership rights. A holder can transfer, redeem through code or deposit into a pool; those abilities do not become shares, votes, insured dollars or a claim on the operator’s revenue.