A borrower proposes or clones a position, deposits collateral and chooses a liquidation price, limit, fee, reserve contribution and challenge period. A new collateral proposal costs 1,000 ZCHF and waits at least three days. Qualified FPS holders can deny it; otherwise anyone can activate it after the waiting period. Interest is charged up front and part of minted ZCHF is retained as that position's borrower reserve.
A challenger deposits the same collateral asset and starts an auction. Below the critical price bidders buy the borrower’s collateral; above it they buy the challenger’s, making self-bidding costly. Auction proceeds and the position's borrower reserve repay the debt first. A remaining deficit reduces FPS equity; if that is exhausted, the general borrower reserve is the final layer and can shift losses to other minters. The method cannot police collateral monopolized by one owner or assets that challengers cannot obtain.
Core contracts are immutable, but governance can approve new minter modules with broad mint, transfer and burn powers. More than 2% of time-weighted FPS votes can veto, and delegation can combine votes. On 2026-09-05 the official index listed the original Minting Hub at 0x7546762fdb1a6d9146b33960545c3f6394265219 and Minting Hub V2 at 0xde12b620a8a714476a97efd14e6f7180ca653557 as active alongside other modules. Immutability prevents code replacement while module approval changes the live minting perimeter.