JUST

Poloniex announced the JST sale on April 9, 2020, and recorded distribution to subscribers on May 5. JST supplied governance utility; USDJ was the dollar-targeting JustStable asset. JUST Foundation announced JustLend’s public opening on December 7, 2020, with jTokens representing supplied assets. The 2023 release added staked-TRX representation through sTRX and Energy Rental. These are different positions, not interchangeable names for JST.

That separation became practical in 2025. A May 16 notice proposed suspending USDJ supply and borrowing before eventual delisting. The June 29 notice said suspension had already occurred, then scheduled a collateral-factor reduction from 75% to zero and a reserve-factor rise from 5% to 100% for around 23:59 Singapore time that night. This establishes suspension by June 29, not its exact execution date or completion of every planned step.

The MiCA paper describes the May vote, not a completed closure of the whole JustStable system. It also lists August 2020 for lending functionality, whereas the Foundation’s launch announcement gives December 7 for public opening. These records should not be collapsed into one event. A jToken holder still depends on the relevant market’s exchange rate and liquidity, and a borrower on collateral and liquidation rules; holding JST alone supplies none of those balances.

JST enters governance only after a 1:1 deposit into WJST. The current rules demand 200 million JST-equivalent votes to propose and more than 600 million affirmative votes, with For above Against, to pass. Executable actions then wait 48 hours. These high absolute thresholds make vote concentration a practical part of the system even though one wrapped JST equals one vote.

Tokenomics routes eligible revenue into open-market buyback and burn rather than direct holder distribution. Burning can reduce supply from the initial 9.9 billion ceiling, but it does not make holders creditors, shareholders or owners of protocol reserves. Future funding sources and burn rules themselves remain governance decisions.

GovernorBravo queues approved actions and Timelock executes privileged setters. The Unitroller, Governor and oracle architecture includes proxies or replaceable implementations, allowing governance to change code and parameters. That makes voting consequential while also creating implementation-change risk after approval.

Liquidation depends on oracle values relayed by a designated poster from Chainlink-derived feeds. A vote cannot reverse a bad price already used to judge an account, so oracle operation is a separate control plane from token voting.

Comptroller code also includes administrator and pause-guardian controls for emergencies. Official documentation identifies contracts and capabilities, but it does not resolve every current legal key holder, signer quorum or accountability process, so 'DAO controlled' should not erase these operator layers.