Reserve Rights

The current RSR contract, 0x320623…d70, replaced the old 0x8762… token on 13 January 2022. It inherited balances lazily through copy-on-write, so an account could hold RSR before a new-contract Transfer event appeared. The repository fixes total supply at 100 billion and says the fork contract cannot be upgraded.

During setup, an owner and pauser controlled the crossing. The published lifecycle then zeroed those roles after the fork. That removes an administrator from the standalone ERC-20; it does not zero the governor, timelock, pauser or freezer attached to every later RToken deployment.

Each RToken—now presented as a Yield DTF—is issued against its own collateral basket. BackingManager holds that basket, and an RToken holder can normally burn the receipt for a pro-rata share. RSR does not represent those assets and cannot be redeemed for them.

RSR becomes economically exposed only when a holder selects one stRSR contract. That pool can receive configured revenue and, in commonly deployed governance, delegates voting power over the corresponding DTF. Another DTF has another pool, another collateral set and potentially another governor.

This segmentation is the protocol’s central bargain. A high return advertised for one stRSR pool measures that DTF’s revenue and risk; it is neither a protocol-wide coupon nor a return promised to everyone holding liquid RSR.

After a collateral default, the system attempts to trade remaining assets into the target basket. If the required RSR sale exceeds what BackingManager already holds, its code calls the selected StRSR contract’s seizeRSR function. The protocol does not guarantee reimbursement to stakers for this first-loss use.

The loss can reach the entire pool. Seizure also removes governance weight, and the unstaking queue is deliberately delayed so stakers cannot simply exit when a foreseeable default or basket change approaches. The reference deployment uses 1,209,600 seconds—two weeks—and a 5% mainnet withdrawalLeak threshold for refreshing asset state after cumulative withdrawal fractions exceed it. These are reference settings; a live DTF may choose other values.

Issuance pause blocks new issuance; trading pause stops backing and revenue management; freeze stops most interactions, including redemption. The state matrix intentionally keeps governance functions enabled, and even permits new staking during a freeze so voting capital can contest a malicious proposal.

That design makes the control map as important as the collateral list. Core components share one upgradeable security domain, governance selects the prime basket and parameters, and BackingManager trades assets. Readers must inspect the actual governor, timelock and role holders for the DTF they use rather than transfer the RSR token’s zeroed roles onto the whole protocol.

Official pages agree on a 100 billion ceiling but not on the current unlocked share. Core Components still prints 53.5 billion; the FAQ and RSR overview say around 60%. They also describe project-controlled Slow and Slower wallets, a four-week delay and a declining Bitcoin-like emissions policy.

Those documents establish custody and policy boundaries, not a precise live float or a legal promise to public holders. Reserve’s terms likewise say RSR and DTFs are experimental, uninsured and not guaranteed by ABC Labs, a bank or a government. These descriptions concern functions provided by the token and protocol; they do not determine every right that may arise under applicable law or a separate agreement.