Resupply USD

Resupply started with an existing position: stablecoins deposited in Curve Lend or FraxLend were already earning interest. Instead of asking the depositor to withdraw that position, the protocol accepts it as collateral for a new reUSD loan. The original lending position continues to earn while the borrower takes on a second debt.

Each collateral market has governance-set loan-to-value rules and may have its own borrowing limit. The minimum mint is 1,000 reUSD; the documented mint fee is zero but governance can introduce one. A zero mint fee does not mean the loan is interest-free. The borrower remains exposed to the underlying lending market as well as Resupply’s valuation and liquidation rules.

Blockscope reconstructs the newly opened wstUSR market as nearly empty when the attacker minted a one-wei share and donated 2,000 crvUSD. The apparent share price jumped, while Resupply rounding returned a zero exchange rate.

That zero made the LTV calculation read no debt burden, allowing the transaction to reach the market’s roughly 10 million reUSD ceiling. The governance record confirms the bad-debt amount; the step-by-step mechanics are the cited forensic reconstruction.

By June 28, the recovery plan said treasuries and contributors had covered 2,868,832 reUSD. It assigned 6 million more to an Insurance Pool burn, about 15.5% of the pool cited in the proposal, and left 1,131,168 reUSD for the DAO to repay later.

Phase 2 did not reverse that loss. Contracts loaded affected accounts from block 22,830,880 and directed up to 2.5 million RSUP across 52 weeks to slashed depositors who stayed. Withdrawal remained possible but permanently forfeited future retention rewards.

Later documentation shows sreUSD as a live ERC-4626 savings vault rather than merely a recovery proposal. It receives 15% of weekly base revenue, while the extra interest charged when reUSD trades below target flows entirely to the vault. There is no Insurance Pool-style exit cooldown.

The distinction matters after the exploit. sreUSD depositors seek variable revenue without agreeing to absorb protocol bad debt; Insurance Pool depositors earn a different stream because their reUSD is available for liquidations and losses. Neither route converts activity-dependent fees into a guaranteed return.