Saturn Dollar

The catalog asset is USDat, symbol USDat, with six decimals. Its Ethereum proxy is 0x23238f20b894f29041f48D88eE91131C395Aaa71. The same Saturn system also issues sUSDat, but sUSDat is an ERC-4626 share backed by digital-credit positions and processed through a withdrawal queue.

Keeping those names apart removes two false claims at once. USDat holders do not receive the reserve yield; code sends it to a configured yield recipient. They also do not directly bear an STRC oracle or liquidation rule inside USDat, because the STRC feed and asynchronous exit belong to sUSDat.

Older projects and tokens have also used Saturn in their names. Address, symbol, decimals and product role—not the word Saturn—identify this asset.

USDat is not a CDP. A user does not lock volatile collateral, borrow dollars and face an auction when a ratio falls. The stablecoin is minted one-for-one through an approved SwapFacility route against another dollar asset. Therefore it has no borrower liquidation threshold and no native USDat/USD oracle.

Saturn's current guide describes redemption as an M0 limit order: USDat is escrowed, an approved solver supplies USDC and the order may fill only in part. The interface rejects quotes costing more than the greater of three dollars or ten basis points, excluding wallet gas. No valid route means no protocol fill.

The alternative is a market sale, such as the USDC/USDat Curve pool. That path can restore a peg through arbitrage, but it adds price impact, pool fee and liquidity risk. A claimed one-dollar target is consequently different from an unconditional one-dollar cash right.

Saturn launched USDat as an M0 extension backed by M, a tokenized-Treasury product. Its public overview still says reserves are 100% M and that minting accepts M or USDC. That accurately describes the old chapter.

On 19 August 2026, tracked deployment records show a timelocked upgrade to implementation 0x496a4A33b6181F4536203488d9a05AC1429E702c. The new MultiMint logic registered old M, allowed it to be replaced by PYUSDx and preserved the original proxy and balances. A later cleanup reduced the M asset cap to zero.

By 5 September, supply was 65,615,475.672780 USDat. The proxy held exactly 65,615,475.672780 PYUSDx, no M, and no tracked alternative-asset balance. The equality is strong evidence of wrapper coverage. It also proves the web overview was no longer a current reserve description.

M0 describes PYUSDx extensions as one-for-one wrappers. MoonPay's February announcement goes one layer lower: PYUSDx enables application stablecoins backed by PayPal USD, and PYUSDx tokens are issued by MoonPay Digital Assets Limited. PYUSD itself is a distinct Paxos-issued token.

This chain of wrappers matters to rights. USDat possession is not direct possession of PYUSD, dollars or Treasury securities. Conversion depends on the USDat SwapFacility and PYUSDx framework; ultimate reserve and issuer performance sit beneath a perfectly matched Ethereum token balance.

Saturn says all USDat capital is visible in its contract and pointed to Accountable for transparency. On review, Accountable warned of an ongoing collateral migration, displayed zero or N/A and reported no verification attestations. It did not independently close the PYUSD custody or liability question.

Ethereum whitelist mode was enabled and the token was not paused on the review date. When enabled, code checks accounts and recipients around wrapping, unwrapping and transfers. The compliance path can freeze an address and force its balance to another recipient; the terms explicitly acknowledge sanctions seizures.

Those powers were concrete addresses. 0x10D59F776db12b4B271b2609CB8b7Ddd0A82703B held pauser, freeze-manager, forced-transfer and whitelist-manager roles. Yield was routed to 0x3dc0aa75a6fd01c3dcf9f6fdaf08308b6489f5b5, while 0x09D6E34cE24D54890fF0BC6a090b5f880F8C729f could change that recipient.

Upgrade control had gained a delay, not disappeared. ProxyAdmin 0xcf1072DA5f0D127AEf99136489BAd08bFa3D1A7D was owned by SaturnTimelock 0xfD5782E3BFF366601da3973aE30C583dE4F08A67. Its minimum delay was five days, and the timelock held DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.

Saturn lists 0x0Bb150DFa86EA5d7742F07FEfCD8E8edA81D64eF as USDat on both BNB Chain and Monad. Live calls returned Saturn USD, USDat and six decimals. Their supplies were 2,024,284.951645 and 27,660,567.233900; neither representation was paused.

These contracts use SaturnOFT logic rather than Ethereum's reserve wrapper. Authorized roles can mint and burn for bridge flow, blacklist users, pause transfers and recover funds from blocked accounts. Their balances are cross-chain liabilities; they do not each hold a duplicate PYUSDx reserve.

Adding all three supplies produced 95,300,327.858325 USDat. That is a useful circulation snapshot, not a solvency formula. Solvency requires matching remote mint/burn messages and locked or backing assets on the home side. The reviewed key-address page names the remote tokens but does not publish a single current global reconciliation report.

Terms updated 31 August 2026 form a contract between interface users and Saturn Global Capital Investments Ltd., a BVI company. They bar U.S. residents and other restricted parties and apply BVI law and arbitration. The product site likewise says access is for eligible participants outside the United States.

The same terms separate the interface from smart-contract transactions and state that protocol interactions are not interactions with the company. They make no representation that USDat will hold a stable value, say the value depends on backing and redemption operations, and warn that digital assets are not protected deposits.

No reviewed clause grants a holder direct title to PYUSD or Treasuries, deposit insurance, or an unconditional claim against the BVI interface company for one dollar. USDat has a measurable reserve wrapper and an operational redemption route. Its ultimate obligor and holder remedy remain less explicit than its code controls.